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INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC/PRIVATE CONTRACTING PARTNERSHIPS
1.1 Summary of the Issue
Internationally, the demand for infrastructure continues to grow as repressed needs of
developed countries and new needs of emerging countries proliferate. This requirement
for infrastructure provision causes great pressure on public expenditure. Member
countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), for
example, devote on average nearly one-fifth of capital formation to infrastructure (1:3).
The increased need for infrastructure coupled with debt and tax limitations on
governments which restricts their ability to provide capital for infrastructure projects has
led to the involvement of the private sector in comprehensive contracting partnerships
1.2 History
The involvement of the private sector in the provision of public infrastructure is not
new. Historically, an interface between the public and private sector has existed with
respect to the essential elements of a project's life cycle: planning, designing,
constructing, financing, and operating the end product Governments have traditionally
contracted with architect and engineering firms for planning and designing services.
Private contractors have also been encumbered for building and operating infrastructure
projects Additionally, financial institutions have been utilized by governments to issue
municipal debt instruments for project financing. However, even with the involvement of
private entities, the government has maintained overall responsibility for controlling the
project across all sectors of the project life cycle.

Recent initiatives taken by governments have altered the conventional methods of
involving the private sector in infrastructure projects. Utilizing complex forms of
contracting, the private sector is becoming involved in infrastructure provision from the
ground up across the entire life cycle of the project. The idea behind the extensive
involvement of the private sector in infrastructure provision is introduced in the build-
operate-transfer (BOT) model of project development. The BOT concept for the
implementation of privatized infrastructure projects may be defined as the granting of a
concession by the government to a private promoter, known as the concessionaire, who is
responsible for the financing, design, construction, operation, and maintenance of a facility
over the concession period before finally transferring the fully operational facility to the
government at no cost. During the concession period, the concessionaire owns and
operates the facility and collects revenues to repay the financing and investment costs, to
maintain and operate the facility, and to make a margin of profit (2:282).
The term "build-operate-transfer" is widely believed to have been first coined in 1984
by Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal within the framework of privatizing Turkey's
public projects. However, the contractual arrangements characteristic ofBOT schemes
have been used for several centuries, and much of the infrastructure of a number of
countries was put into place by the use of similar mechanisms (3:222). Because of the
benefits that can be derived, there has been a renewed interest recently in the application
ofBOT concepts toward the provision of infrastructure. Examples of infrastructure
projects that have been privatized on a BOT basis are power stations, water-supply and
sewage-treatment plants, toll roads, tunnels, and bridges Countries where BOT projects

are in place include the United Kingdom, France, and Ireland, among OECD countries,
and Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Thailand among developing countries (3:222). The United
States also has experimented with similar contract arrangements mainly in toll road
projects, however, its experience is comparatively more limited.
1.3 Benefits of Implementation
Public-private partnerships offer the most effective means of providing infrastructure
in many cases. As suggested previously, the greatest benefit to be derived from private
sector involvement in infrastructure provision is the ability to execute urgently needed
projects without placing additional strain on government spending. Public-private
partnerships also encourage the optimization of operation and construction costs. It is in
the promoter's interest to look not only at the initial capital costs, but also at the operating
costs and to strike an optimal balance By contrast, public spending controls can result in
an overemphasis on driving down initial investment to the detriment of costs over the
lifetime of a project Another benefit to be derived from privatization of infrastructure
projects is cost savings The design/construction interface can often be a source of
conflict and cost overruns. Placing responsibility for both design and construction within
a single organization eliminates the interface and encourages the promoter to focus on the
cost-effective solution of the problems that arise. Finally, public-private infrastructure
projects allow for better allocation of construction risk. One of the principal risks
associated with infrastructure projects is cost overruns during the construction stage. This
risk can best be managed by a contractor. The government is shielded from construction

risks when infrastructure is privatized yet is able to provide the social benefit of functional
facilities to the public (4:59-60).
In summary, governments are coming to appreciate the benefits of private sector
infrastructure provision as public spending is curtailed and projects are delivered more
cost effectively. As such, public-private partnerships are being viewed as the appropriate
vehicle to advance certain infrastructure projects. Specific elements of public-private
partnerships, the structure ofBOT processes, and an analysis of projects completed under
BOT contracting mechanisms will be discussed in the remainder of this report.

CHAPTER 2
RISKS AND GUARANTEES IN PUBLIC/PRIVATE
CONTRACTING PARTNERSHIPS
2.1 Private Sector Risk Burden
With the development ofnew trends in public-private contracting partnerships more
risk is assumed by the promoter as compared to traditional methods of contracting. Under
conventional mechanisms the capacity for risk sharing between public and private parties
exists. For example, a private contractor is typically able to negotiate with the public
client concerning claims arising during the construction process. Under contracting
methods such as the BOT concept this is no longer possible as promoters are expected to
provide guarantees against completion risk, cost overrun risk, performance risk, and
financing risk. Therefore, the ability of a private entity to assume project risks is a
significant element of new practices in public-private contracting.
The rationale for BOT-type contracts from the government's perspective is that if
private firms are willing to shoulder part of the risks involved, not only will the state be
better protected but also the total risk to the economy as a result of poor investment
decision making may be reduced (5:15). Also, since the objective ofBOT projects is
based, in part, on governments reducing their indebtedness, it is essential that the
promoter carry the maximum risk (6: 184). From a promoter's perspective risks need to
be balanced by potential rewards and assurances are necessary to show that revenues are
adequate to cover costs and allow for a reasonable profit (7:43). Many factors influence
the risks that a promoter may be willing to take. A promoter will be less agreeable to
undertake a project in a developing country, for example, because of market uncertainties

Also, when government imposes limits such as establishing a ceiling on rates or tolls to be
charged by a concessionaire operating a facility, the risk of undertaking the project may be
too great. As such, an appropriate balance of risks and guarantees between the parties
involved in public-private contract arrangements must be established to ensure the
likelihood of success for specific projects.
2.2 Public Sector Guarantees
The greatest level of risk minimization will occur if market forces are the principal
determinant substantiating the need for a project. With the absence of explicit or implicit
government guarantees, only those projects which are economically justified will be
realized (5:15). However, instability exists in certain commercial and political climates
and creates risks and uncertainties which may be beyond what a private promoter can
manage. In such instances, government guarantees are necessary to ensure a stable
environment for advancing a project. The following guarantees have been utilized by
governments in managing different BOT-type contracts to create conditions suitable for
the successful execution of projects (8: 109-1 12):
2.2.1 Concession Period
The concession period refers to the amount of time the project's promoter is granted
rights to operate a project. The concession period may or may not include construction
time The revenues collected by the concessionaire during this time will be used to pay
project debt and operating costs with the remainder held as profit.

2.2.2 Support Loans
Support loans are funds offered by a government to support the financing of a
project. The amount of capital offered and terms of indenture utilized in BOT projects has
varied widely. Instead of providing loans, some governments have arranged "emergency
loan facilities" to provide funds for sponsors should the need arise.
2.2.3 Minimum Operating Income
The concept of minimum operating income refers to the government guaranteeing a
minimum income through underwriting costs incurred or revenue generated by a
concessionaire. Utilizing various methods the government will, in effect, offset an
unforeseen escalation in costs or subsidize revenue up to a guaranteed minimum by
providing funds to the concessionaire
2.2.4 Concession to Operate Existing Facility
Applicable mainly to BOT-type projects involving transportation systems such as
roads, bridges, and tunnels, governments have granted promoters the right to operate
existing infrastructure along with the new facility during the concession period. This
reduces the risk of the promoter losing revenue due to competition with existing facilities
operated by the government.

2.2.5 Commercial Freedom
This condition refers to the absence of government restrictions placed on a promoter.
Commercial freedom grants a promoter considerable leverage in establishing usage fees
during the concession period.
2.2.6 Foreign Exchange Guarantee
This type of guarantee offered by government serves to eliminate the price fluctuation
risk in the currency market and is applicable to those projects where foreign currencies are
involved in the financing. One of the major problems with infrastructure projects in
developing countries is that they do not generate income in the currency used to finance
the development effort. Thus, foreign exchange guarantees are necessary to enable the
project sponsors to remit freely all project revenues in an attempt to reassure lenders and
investors.
2.2.7 Interest Rate Guarantee
In cases of development in areas where unstable inflation exists, governments have
offered guaranteed repayment costs to reimburse a project's financiers the difference
between a set interest rate and actual market-driven interest rates. This serves to limit the
financial risks associated with such a project.

2.2.8 "No Second Facility" Guarantee
This type of guarantee offered by government promises a promoter that a competing
facility will not be built or an existing facility will not be improved for a set amount of time
thereby eliminating the risk of competition.
2.3 Private Sector Undertakings
In return for government guarantees and incentives, the project sponsors are expected
to undertake defined responsibilities to demonstrate their commitment to the project and
to provide the basic security for the construction and operating risks that are within their
control (8: 1 12). The ability to assume project risks is evaluated in areas specifically
associated with the construction contracting methods, operating plans, and financing
schemes employed by the sponsor. To convey their ability to manage construction risks,
sponsors may propose to complete the building phase via mechanisms that provide for a
fixed price. Moreover, performance bonds can also be utilized by sponsors to limit the
construction risk. With respect to operating plans, sponsors may be compelled to limit the
tolls and other usage fees charged during the operating period. This practice forces the
sponsor to focus on operating efficiency. Finally, the financing proposed by a sponsor
provides significant insight into his ability to shoulder the monetary risks associated with
the project The private financing of projects will be discussed in detail in the following
section Overall, research conducted on risks and guarantees in BOT tenders has
supported the premise that the awarding of a concession is strongly related to a
promoter's ability to retain and reallocate risks and offer guarantees against risks and
uncertainties (6: 1 83).

2.4 Conclusion
In summary, depending on the circumstances surrounding the project, the application
of certain guarantees by both public agencies and private sector sponsors in an effort to
control risk comprises an important element ofBOT-type contracts. The degree of
government involvement must be carefully considered. There is no point, for example, in
having a public authority allow a private promoter to make profits while tax payers retain
excessive risk. Neither can a private promoter singularly shoulder risks associated with
executing projects in an unstable political or commercial climate. Therefore, it is essential
that the proper level of government support be available, that certain risks be properly
allocated to the private sponsors, and that the contractual terms clearly establish roles and





PRIVATE FINANCING OF PUBLIC PROJECTS
3.1 Financial Package Composition
In a BOT-type contractual arrangement the promoter is fully responsible for arranging
the necessary finance. In preparing a financial package, the promoter must consider the
commercial and financial elements of the project. The commercial elements involve the
guarantees and limitations imposed by government concerning contractual terms such as
the concession period and toll structures. The financial elements include sources of loans,
interest rates, capital structure, repayment and drawdown schedules, and the currency of
loans and payments. In the evaluation ofBOT proposals, the quality of the financial
package is rigorously assessed. Overall, the attractiveness of the financial package is a key
determinant in choosing a winning proposal (9:304-310).
In raising the necessary finance for a project, the promoter often incorporates a
combination of debt and equity in the capital structure. Equity finance represents the
injection of risk capital by the promoter and other equity investors into the concession
company. In a successful project equity investors are rewarded with dividend income
generated by profits. Debt finance comprises capital loaned by banks or similar lending
institutions with provisions strictly controlling how the funds are utilized. Debt holders
receive compensation for lending capital through interest payments made by the borrower
over the term of the loan. Between the two, equity generally involves more risk since
servicing the debt takes priority over dividend payments to equity investors. In other
words, dividends can only be paid after debt claims have been met (2:282). Since an
11

equity investment involves more risk than a debt outlay, a promoter will need to provide a
higher rate of return to equity shareholders as compared to debt issuers as compensation
for carrying additional risk. This results in equity financing being more expensive for a
promoter than debt financing. Therefore, the capital structure designed by a promoter
must contain an optimal mix of debt and equity financing.
In obtaining venture capital through independent arrangements with financial
institutions, project promoters are forced to pay a higher premium for borrowing funds
than their public sector counterparts. In a publicly financed project to construct a
roadway, for example, funds are obtainable through tax-exempt municipal bond issues
which, according to the June 18, 1996, edition of the Wall Street Journal, yield
approximately six percent. Whereas, companies floating private bond issues to finance a
road would probably need to offer at least a 9-10% return due to inherently greater risks
and lack of a tax shield (10:83). Therefore, private firms must be formidably efficient to
overcome this handicap in building facilities at a price equal to or less than that which the
public sector could construct projects.
Recognizing this impediment a congressional commission recommended broader
access to the tax-exempt market for private sponsors of infrastructure projects in a 1993
report. However, political opposition existed, and no legislation evolved. Although this
has not stopped private agencies from developing partnerships with the public sector to
access the tax-exempt market. For example, in February 1993 First Boston Corporation
arranged a $1.1 billion issue of tax-exempt bonds for the Mid-State Toll Road project in
12

California that was sponsored by private developers and local government (10:83). This
project will be discussed in detail in Chapter Five. Overall, these hybrid partnerships
between the public and private sector have served to increase the capacity for executing
infrastructure projects.
3.2 Optimal Capital Structure
The optimal capital structure of a project can be evaluated by examining the functions
of debt and equity. Financing with debt offers an effective means to raise capital through
value generated from the operating efficiencies of the financial markets. However, debt
issuers often do not have a comprehensive understanding of the technical aspects of a
proposed project. As such, they gain a level of comfort in seeing a certain degree of
commitment from the promoter in the form of an equity investment. Since the promoter is
bearing some of the financial risk, lenders feel more confident about the promoter's
incentive to successfully complete the project. Financing with equity, therefore, decreases
the burden placed on the project to service debt, thereby reducing the risk of repayment
and signifying the promoter's belief in the economic viability of the project. Accordingly,
lenders typically specify a debt-to-equity ratio that must be maintained in the capital
structure designed by the promoter in order to be granted a loan. Also, from the
standpoint of public agencies overseeing operations, a certain level of equity is necessary
to provide the confidence that the promoter is serious about the long-term success of the
project over the concession period. Governments typically favor proposals with threshold
equity levels between 20% and 30% of the total financial package Therefore, a high level
of equity is usually desirable and required to form the cornerstone of a sound financial plan
13

for promoters to obtain financial commitments and earn the faith of both lenders and the
project's sponsor (2:282, 287).
With respect to financial risk the ability of a promoter to establish an appropriate
financial package is directly related to the market in which the project is being sponsored.
There is a clear distinction between the financial instruments available in a developed,
mature economy and those found in the economy of an emerging country. In a developed
country, a significant amount of equity can be raised for BOT projects from investors in
the domestic market. In developing countries, it is difficult to raise a substantial amount
of equity because of inefficient or nonexistent capital markets, therefore, debt instruments
play a far more significant role. In developing countries, more intervention from the
government in terms of offering certain guarantees as previously discussed is necessary to
maximize a project's chances of success (3:224).
3.3 Determining Cost of Capital
The overall feasibility of the financial package is evaluated by comparing the project's
cost of development capital to estimated returns on investment. To determine the cost of
investment capital, the weighted average cost of capital (WACC), which is a combination
of the costs of each capital component, is determined (1 1:335). The cost of capital
components refers to the rate of return required by investors. In most cases the capital
components are debt and equity, and the cost of equity exceeds that of debt. To illustrate
consider the example of a project that will be financed with 20% equity and 80% debt.
Based on the level of risk determined for the project, equity investors require a 10% return
14

on their investment while the bond indenture specifies a 7.5% return. The weighted
average cost of capital is calculated as follows:
WACC = 0.2(10%) + 0.8(7.5%) = 8%
Therefore, the promoter will need to pay an 8% overall return to finance this project.
To determine a project's return on investment an estimate of the project's cash flows
over the concession period is needed. Using discounted cash flow analysis procedures the
internal rate of return (IRR) of the project can be determined from the project's
anticipated cash flow schedule ( 1 1:395). For the project to be viable, the IRR must
exceed the WACC. Concerning the illustration, an IRR greater than 8% is necessary for
the project to economically viable.
Considering the elements involved in the financial analysis, many factors exist which
effect the sustainability of a project. The technical certainty of a project or the uniqueness
of a certain technical approach reduces risk and thus enhances the viability of a project.
Intervention by the government in setting the concession period and controlling allowable
tolls and tariffs assessed to users during the operating period impacts project cash flows.
Uncertainties caused by inefficient or nonexistent financial markets affects the ability to
raise funds. The level of equity maintained by a promoter communicates his expectations
for the success of the project and influences the ability to raise additional financing. Also,
competition directly affects the financial package as lower profit margins may be accepted
15

amidst threats posed by challenging firms. Overall, governments want the best situation
for themselves and at the same time they want promoters to make sure that the project is
financeable. Achieving a balanced financial package providing the monetary resources to
implement a sound technical solution and offering acceptable user costs over the
concession period requires special initiatives on the part of promoters. Ultimately, the
success ofthe promoter will hinge on his ability to implement an innovative technical




ELEMENTS OF PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
4.1 Contract Tendering Process
The tendering process for BOT-type contracts typically originates with governments
soliciting proposals. Effort expended by the government in preparing the proposal has a
significant impact on the risk borne by the contractor in submitting his package.
Governments may want to avoid too much detail in issuing a request for proposals to keep
options open for the private sector. However, sufficient guidance and technical detail
should be provided to establish the objectives of the project and to enable perspective
bidders to provide a proposal which meets expectations. Figure 4. 1 outlines the risk
variances between public and private sectors in the proposal solicitation process.
Basically, the more effort governments expend prior to soliciting proposals the greater
assurances prospective sponsors have about the project's validity. Therefore, to ensure
competitive proposals are received, government agencies must establish their commitment
to the project through undertaking comprehensive planning initiatives.
Once received, proposals are evaluated on several factors, the most notable of which
are the technical solution and the financing package. A short list of sponsors may then be
selected for further consideration or a single sponsor may be awarded the concession.
Once the winning concessionaire has been selected final negotiations between the sponsor
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4.2 Project Execution Phases
From the standpoint of private sponsors, a BOT project comprises five phases:
preinvestment, preconstruction, construction, operation, and transfer. A project sponsor
generates initial interest in pursing a BOT concession and commits the resources necessary
to begin the process. A sponsor, often a construction contractor seeking to generate new
business, may be an individual, firm, or consortium. Roles assumed by a sponsor upon
initiating interest in competing for a BOT tender include acting as a consultant in
conducting the feasibility study and completing conceptual design during the
preinvestment phase. If the sponsor feels the project is viable, a bid is prepared for the
client offering the BOT concession. Once the government decides which bidder(s) will
continue in the tendering process, the remaining sponsor(s) begin work to negotiate
concession agreements as the project progresses through the preconstruction phase. Also
during the preconstruction phase the sponsor attempts to raise equity and garner loans
from financiers. When the government grants the concession to the winning sponsor, the
project progresses through the construction phase. During this phase the sponsor
oversees the building of the facility utilizing either the company's own resources or a
contract with an outside entity for construction services. Offtake and supply agreements
are also negotiated by the sponsor to encumber future users and gather supplies for the
construction effort. Finally, during the operation phase, the sponsor is responsible for
operating and maintaining the facility before it is returned to the government at the end of
the concession period (3:223). Table 4.1 summarizes the phases through which a sponsor
progresses in completing a BOT project.
19

TABLE 4.1 BOT PROJECT PHASES
PHASE SPONSOR ACTIVITY
Preinvestment Conduct feasibility study
Complete conceptual design
Prepare proposal
Preconstruction Negotiate concession agreement
Raise equity and procure loans
Complete design effort
Construction Oversee construction activity (in-house or contract)
Negotiate offtake and supply agreements
Operation Oversee operation and maintenance activity (in-house or
contract)
Amortize debt and distribute profits to equity investors
Transfer Release operational facility to government at no cost
(3:223)
4.3 Concession Companies
In practice, a special concession company is usually formed by project sponsors in the
process of competing for a BOT tender Figure 4.2 depicts the relationships between the
concession company and the various other parties associated with the implementation of a
BOT contract. The concession company is usually established in the country soliciting a
project and may comprise a joint venture of two, three, or more parties to act as sponsors.
This arrangement is partly because the scale of the projects is such that the risks must be
shared by several organizations, and also because a wide range of expertise is required
beyond what is usually found in a single organization Additionally, legal council and
other external professional advisors become involved in the establishment of the
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FIGURE 4.2 BOT CORPORATE STRUCTURE (3:223)
Other significant factors support the need to develop such complex concession
companies as well. First, the cost of promoting projects is disproportionately high. The
extensive scope ofBOT projects contributes to high promoting costs. Moreover, unlike
traditional arrangements, the concession company has to finance design and engineering
costs and incorporate these outlays in their financial analysis. Therefore, tendering costs
for privately financed projects are several times larger than for an equivalent traditional
contract and necessitate the involvement of a company strong enough to bear this financial
burden. Secondly, since privately financed infrastructure projects assume greater
construction risk than traditional arrangements, projects are normally financed on a non-
recourse basis. This type of financing means that financiers, not having recourse to the
balance sheets of the concession company, will insist on solid, interlocking contracting
arrangements (4:61). As such, complex contractual agreements encumbering the sponsors
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comprising a concession company are implemented to equitably distribute project risks.
This further propagates the size and inextricability of organizations bound in joint ventures
to create a concession company.
4.4 Comparison of Contract Types
As discussed above the concession company undertakes to perform or procure a wide
range of functions in executing a BOT project. The effort involved in managing a BOT
project is far beyond that which is required in operating under the more usual types of
contracts used for construction. For example, under a traditional construction contract, a
sponsor performs mainly as a constructor undertaking only limited detail design in building
a facility. With a design-and-build contract, the sponsor provides all of the detail design
and perhaps some conceptual design as well as construction services. Once the facility is
complete, the client may contract for operation and maintenance services. However, with
all of these more traditional arrangements the financing and the bulk of the operation rests
with the client (3:224).
Figure 4.3 illustrates the relationships between the various types of contracts over the
life cycle of a project. The figure depicts a typical project cash flow for an infrastructure
project The cash flow curve is based on total costs and revenue from either the client's or
the concessionaire's perspective. The different functions to be performed, such as







FIGURE 4.3 CUMULATIVE PROJECT CASH FLOW (3:224)
activities; however, in practice there will be considerable overlaps between them. Below
the curve the time scales for the most common types of contract arrangements are shown
in relation to that for a typical BOT project. The figure communicates several key ideas.
Most notably, the significant commitment required by the sponsor over the lifetime of the
project is shown. Cash flow risk is borne exclusively by the sponsor. The initial cash
commitment provided by the client under the traditional contracting approaches is now
offered by the BOT sponsor. Also, the operating expenses typically paid by the client are
now the responsibility ofthe sponsor. Therefore, the sponsor must be concerned with
costs and revenues throughout the lifetime of the project.
Figure 4.3 also indicates the flexibility the sponsor has in executing a project.
Depending on the circumstances, the concession company may utilize one of the more
23

traditional contracting arrangements to complete a certain phase of the project. For
example, to complete construction of a facility, the concession company can enter into a
fixed price or design/build contract with a contractor. Moreover, contracting schemes are
inherently more efficient for private sponsors as they are not as strictly bound by
regulatory processes as are governments (3:224). In summary, the greater flexibility
enjoyed by project promoters in having the ability to choose between several methods in





COMPARATIVE STUDY OF BOT CONTRACTS
5.1 Introduction
BOT-type contracts have been implemented internationally to execute several diverse
projects. Existing circumstances such as the state of development of the host country, the
attitude of public and private sectors towards initiating joint ventures, and the condition of
the economy contribute to the development of differing contractual parameters. In this
chapter contractual aspects of actual BOT projects will be evaluated to provide insight
into how the responsibilities were delineated, how project financing was obtained, and
how risks were distributed among the parties.
5.2 United States 7 Experience
The implementation ofBOT projects in the United States is especially evident in road
construction. Reinforcing the common impetus driving BOT projects, the scarcity of
financial resources at the federal, state, and local levels of government has led to the
exploration of alternative ways of providing needed highway capacity. Limited revenue
sources coupled with the increased demand for highway capacity has forced governments
to consider the possibility of privately financed highways. Currently, projects undertaken




5.2.1 Virginia Toll Road
The construction of the Dulles Greenway linking Dulles International Airport and
Leesburg, Virginia, marks the implementation of the United States' first privately financed
project (14:49). Opened on September 30, 1995, the $175 million toll road is a four-lane
divided highway spanning 14.1 miles of Virginia's countryside. The road is viewed as a
catalyst in supporting the continued development of the Washington, D.C., metropolitan
area west of the city's beltway.
The ability to use the private sector in developing the project was made possible by
the state legislature passing the Virginia Highway Corporation Act in 1988, enabling a
private concern to build, own, and operate a toll road for profit (14:49). The legislation
mandates that sponsoring corporations must be chartered by the State of Virginia and will
be subject to regulation as a public utility. As such, the State Corporation Commission
regulates the tolls that are to be charged during the concession period. Also, the charter
provides that highways be constructed according to the standards used by the Virginia
Department of Transportation. To assure compliance with the construction standards,
state highway engineers are allowed to perform continuous inspection and testing of the
work in progress (15:1 62).
The actual execution of the Dulles Greenway project was hampered by a turbulent
beginning. The original investment group, the Toll Road Corporation of Virginia, faced
many hurdles after they submitted their proposal for the project in 1989. The project was
slowed by the departure of the original engineer and the original contractor, who also held
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an equity stake in the investment. The project was delayed further by an economic
recession which caused the slowdown ofdevelopment in the Washington, D.C. area and
fueled skepticism on the part of investors. Also, legal issues contributed to deterring
progress. A significant barrier was posed by the lack of power of eminent domain held by
the sponsor. This necessitated complicated and lengthy negotiations to acquire more than
700 acres of right-of-way from private landowners and the Dulles Airport Authority.
Taken together, these factors contributed to delaying the execution of the project by five
years (14:49).
Persistence eventually was rewarded, however. With a new designer, Dewberry &
Davis, and constructor, Brown and Root, Inc., in place and the economy in northern
Virginia experiencing a recovery, the project began to attract the interest of investors.
Through the summer of 1993, the reformed ownership group known as the Toll Road
Investors Partnership II (TRIP II), finalized a $340 million debt-equity financing package
with no state guarantees. A consortium of investors, primarily insurance companies,
committed $258 million in long term financing, with an average maturity of about 30
years. The remainder of the required financing for the project was from a group of banks
and from equity contributed by the partners. The problem of obtaining the 700 acres of
land for the right-of-way was also overcome as most ofthe landowners readily agreed to
sell or donate the land with the expectation that development would substantially increase
the value of their remaining holdings (15:162).
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From the state's perspective the project's risk appears to have been assumed entirely
by the private concerns. With private financing and no government guarantees, there
seems little likelihood that financial risks could be shifted to the government. Concerning
the perceived risk to the public interest of the owner's extracting monopoly profits, the
regulation imposed by the State Corporation Commission negates this possibility.
Specifically, the firm has agreed to limit its tolls to amounts required to provide a rate of
return of 14 percent on its invested capital for the first six years. Proposals to increase
tolls beyond the six year mark are subject to the commission's approval. Overall, the
continued smooth execution of the project should support future private infrastructure
development initiatives in the United States.
5.2.2 Private Highway Development in California
Based on an unprecedented reliance people in the State of California place on their
ability to travel via automobile, an ever-growing demand exists for expansion of the state
highway system. As has been a recurring theme, voter-enacted limits on the growth of
government revenues has severely limited the ability of state and local governments to
finance highway construction projects. This conflict between the demand for increased
highway capacity and the limits on governments' ability to finance that construction has
led to the exploration of privately financed alternatives (15:163).
California Assembly Bill 680 (AB680) enacted in 1989 enables the California
Department of Transportation (Caltrans) to enter into agreements with private companies
for the development and operation of highway facilities. Under the legislation, no state
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funds can be used to support development. Tolls are to be set by the private sponsors and
may be collected over a 35 year concession period. Tolls rates are to be limited based on
government imposed ceilings on total return negotiated for individual contracts. The
ceilings vary depending on the perceived level of risk involved with each project.
Moreover, projects are subject to the same design and construction oversight as a
comparable road built with public funds and must be maintained to Caltrans standards.
Provisions to protect the private sector include the imposition ofdamages on the state if it
acts to reduce the project's economic value, such as by building competing roads nearby,
and the establishment of strict deadlines for the state to review plans.
In soliciting proposals for demonstration projects under AB680, Caltrans utilized a
two-stage screening and selection process. Under criteria established for selecting the
winning proposals, Caltrans evaluated offerings based on technical and procedural
elements. However, before a proposal could be selected for implementation, approval of
the financial plan was required from an independent party. Appendix A contains pertinent
excerpts from the Guidelinesfor Conceptual Project Proposals issued by Caltrans
detailing the selection process. Ultimately, four proposals were selected for development
under the enabling legislation amounting to approximately $3 billion for building 550 lane
miles ofnew primary roads (16:2). By all accounts, the projects chosen were the most
possible to build and the most financeable from tolls and real estate development revenues.
Also, the groups seeking to develop and operate the projects included top experts in each
of the requisite disciplines and possessed sufficient financial staying power. Carl Williams,
assistant Director of Caltrans summarized the unique characteristics of the winning
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projects by saying: "We took the cream of the cream. These are the projects that are
likeliest to produce almost instant high volumes of traffic or where the financial
support from the landowners and communities is sufficient to make these deals
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With respect to these four projects, distinct differences exist in the level of risk
involved. Two of the projects, the San Diego Expressway and the Mid-State Toll Road,
are similar to the Dulles Greenway in that their success depends, in part, on the
development that is anticipated to occur along the highway right of way. Sponsors must
utilize this growth potential to compel present owners to donate or sell at reasonable
prices the land required for the right of way. In effectively doing so sponsors will keep the
cost of development under control. Due to this reliance on future development, the risk
associated with these toll roads is greater than that for the other two projects which are
being constructed in already populated areas. To compensate for increased risk, the
government controlled ceiling on project returns is greater for the projects being
constructed in the undeveloped areas. Specifically, the least risky SR 91 project has a
ceiling of 1 7% annually while the most risky Mid-State Tollway project has one of
21.25% (17:69).
The incorporation of guarantees by the state marks an important effort to balance the
risks of the projects. All projects are structured to reduce the liability of the sponsors by
having the facilities conveyed to the state upon completion of construction. Under the
enabling legislation the state will lease the facility to the sponsors for the 35 year franchise
period to reduce the liability exposure of the private sector. Also, the financial position of
the sponsors is helped by the state in that the demonstration projects will not be subject to
property taxes (18). Actions specific to each project have also been undertaken by the
government in an effort to control risk. Most notably, the government has taken special
initiatives to support the Santa Ana Viaduct Expressway and the SR 91 Express Lane
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projects. Since the construction for these projects is in a developed area, land acquisition
is comparatively more difficult. In a highly populated area land is commonly held in
relatively small, more expensive parcels. This situation makes it exceedingly difficult and
costly for sponsors to assemble the parcels required for a highway right of way. As such,
government assistance has enabled promoters to overcome this barrier by donating land
already owned by the public. The Santa Ana Expressway involved the donation of "air
rights" to permit building over the dry Santa Ana River channel while the SR 91
Expressway involved the concession of an existing public highway right ofway (15:165).
Overall, the California toll road projects continue to progress albeit at a slow pace.
Philip Warriner of the Caltrans Office of Public/Private Partnerships recently related the
status of the four projects in a phone conversation with the author. According to Mr.
Warriner. the SR 91 Express Lanes project is fully operational as ofDecember 1995.
Appendix B contains excerpts from the Amended and Restated Development Franchise
Agreement between Caltrans and California Private Transportation Company, L.P.,
pursuant to the execution of this project. The San Diego Expressway SR 125 project is
nearing completion of extensive environmental reviews and is planned to be under
construction by the end of 1997. The remaining two projects have been beset by political
difficulties that threaten to suspend the projects indefinitely. Overall, financial, political,
legal, and environmental issues have constrained the maturation of the projects. Progress
is necessarily slow as the balance of risk and reward between the public and private sector
in the execution of franchise for profit projects is carefully examined. The success of such
projects in California will greatly influence future initiatives with BOT contracting
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arrangements in the United States. As quoted by California Transportation Ventures
(CTV) in its proposal for SR 125: "Many in the transportation industry are looking to the
success or failure of the California experiment as the principal indicator of the future
direction of transportation privatization" (16:3).
5.3 International Experience
Unlike the United States, other nations have freely accepted the notion that any
facility or service capable of generating cash-flow and profit is capable of being privatized.
Several projects have been initiated internationally under BOT contract arrangements.
The six projects to be discussed in this section are the first to be privately financed under
BOT schemes and are either under construction or already in operation (8: 108). The
projects to be considered include Australia's $550 million Sydney Harbour tunnel, the
United Kingdom's $310 million Queen Elizabeth II Bridge, United Kingdom/France's $13
billion Channel Tunnel, China's $517 million Shajiao power plant in Guandong province,
Malaysia's $1.8 billion North-South expressway, and Thailand's $880 million Bangkok
Second Stage expressway.
Of the six projects considered three are in developed countries and three are in
developing countries. Differing circumstances necessitated project sponsors assuming
diversified responsibilities and undertaking multiple strategies in the structuring of
proposals. Table 5.2 compares key features of the six projects. Government incentives
were also utilized to various degrees in these projects in an effort to balance associated
financial, technical, and political risk. Although the governments did not guarantee loans,
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they provided other forms of guarantees to protect the sponsors and lenders from such
risks. Because of the magnitude and complexity ofBOT schemes, these indirect
guarantees were necessary to ensure the right political and commercial environments in
which to advance the projects. Table 5.3 summarizes the initiatives undertaken by
government in implementing these projects. The following sections detail poignant
aspects of these projects as originally documented by R. L. K. Tiong in a journal article
appearing in the January 1990 edition of the Journal ofManagement in Engineering
(8:107-122).
TABLE 5.2
COMPARATIVE FEATURES OF INTERNATIONAL BOT PROJECTS
Developed Nation Developing Nation
































$80 million $17 million $9 million $170 million
Equity
(shareholders)
$18 million $0 $1.72 billion $0 $180 million $0
Equitydebt 5:95 O100 2O80 3:97 1090 20:80
Rate of return 6% inflation
indexed
N/A 10-20% NIA 12-17% 10-20%
























Support loans Yes No No No Yes No
Minimum operating
income
Yes No No Yes Yes No
Concession to operate
existing facility
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes (Tolls
shared)
Commercial freedom No No Yes No No Yes (Partial)
Foreign exchange
guarantee
No No No Yes Yes No
Interest rate guarantee No No No No Yes No
"No second facility"
guarantee
No No Yes No No No
(8:109)
5.3.1 Sydney Harbour Tunnel
The Sydney Harbour tunnel project was won by the Sydney Harbour Tunnel
Company, which is a joint venture by two construction companies, Australia's Transfield
and Japan's Kumagai Gumi. The tunnel, 2.3 kilometers long linking Sydney to the North
Shore by a submerged section, opened on August 31, 1992. The 30-year concession
period began at this time.
Guarantees and concessions structured around this project include the provision of an
interest-free loan of $125 million by the government to cover the preliminary construction
costs of the tunnel. The loan, amounting to approximately 23% of the total project costs,
is to be repaid over a 30 year period. The government also guaranteed a minimum traffic
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toll income to the project promoters. This action protects the company during the
operational phase by providing compensation for unanticipated increases in electricity
tariff, wages, and unforeseen cost escalation. Another government concession granted the
project sponsors rights to operate the existing Sydney bridge in addition to the tunnel.
The fees on both the bridge and the tunnel were originally established at $1 .25 per car
based on 1986 prices. This toll will increase in $0.65 increments to keep pace with
inflation. In exchange for these government concessions, the Sydney Harbour Tunnel
Company assumed risks for cost and time overruns by offering a turnkey, lump sum
construction contract and by providing a performance bond of $23 million. The
government would have been able to draw the bonds should the company have abandoned
work or if there was more than an 18-month time overrun. Also, the government does
maintain the ability to limit the company's operating profit under terms established in the
contract.
Financing for this project has been generated through a combination of debt and
equity raised between the sponsors, government, and private investors. The cornerstone
of the financing arrangement is $279 million raised through the issuing of 30-year tunnel
bonds. This innovative, all-Australian financing technique reduced fundraising costs and
provided attractive features to investors. These features include: (1) An extended
maturity of 30 years, longer than the usual maturity of 10 or 20 years; (2) repayment of




5.3.2 Queen Elizabeth II Bridge
The Queen Elizabeth II Bridge is the third River Thames crossing at Dartford, joining
the London M25 orbital motorway. The project company is a consortium composed of
several banks and Britain's Trafalgar House group comprising the Dartford River
Crossing Limited (DRC). The 2871 meter bridge consists of a 812 meter cable stayed
bridge flanked by viaduct approach spans of 1052 meters and 1008 meters. The main span
was closed over the Thames on June 11, 1991, and the contract completed on schedule in
September 1991 almost five years from the conditional award of the concession.
An interesting aspect of this project involves the concession obtained by the sponsor
to operate existing tunnels in addition to the new bridge. In its proposal, the winning
sponsor company offered to purchase the two existing toll tunnels at a cost of $80 million.
With this purchase the company would earn toll income from the start of the concession,
thereby reducing the initial financing requirements and allowing immediate payments to be
made to investors. Tolls collected from tunnel operations are expected to produce
approximately $120 million in revenue during the construction period, nearly 40% of the
total investment.
The privatization of this project served to eliminate construction risks typically
associated with contracts between the public and private sector. In arranging to build the
bridge on a turnkey contract, Dartford River Crossing subcontracted with its subsidiaries
on a firm price basis subject to increases relating to inflation and design changes. With
this close relationship almost all normally accepted risks were eliminated, including the
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unforeseen ground condition risk of placing bridge piers on the river bed, a risk not
normally taken by contractors. To further guard against construction risks, the project
company arranged $36 million contingent bank loans in its package to meet overrun
financing and working capital requirements.
The financing of the Dartford bridge was similar to the Sydney tunnel in that all funds
were raised locally. However, unlike the Sydney tunnel project, virtually no equity was
involved in the financing package. The project company was capitalized with a purely
nominal equity of $1,800. Financing for the project was through $121 million of
subordinated loan stock and a $185 million syndicated bank loan. The key to the project's
success was that while there was no equity risk borne by the sponsors, there was also no
opportunity for equity profit. Under this arrangement, the concession could revert to the
government earlier once sufficient surpluses have accrued to meet the costs of all debt.
5.3.3 Channel Tunnel
The 50 kilometer Channel Tunnel consists of two 7.3 meter diameter rail tunnels and
a 4.5 meter diameter service tunnel linking Great Britain and France. The sponsoring
company, Eurotunnel, consists of Britain's Channel Tunnel group, a consortium of British
banks and contractors, and France's France-Manche, a consortium of French banks and
contractors. Having begun in 1987, the project came to fruition in the Spring of 1994.
Under the concession Eurotunnel was given the guarantee of full commercial
freedom, including the ability to determine its tariffs. Half of its revenues are to be
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generated through agreements with the state railways using the tunnel to link London with
the high-speed train network now under development in Europe. Other revenues are to
arise from shuttling commercial vehicles through the tunnels on high-speed trains.
Similar to the Dartford River Crossing consortium, Eurotunnel assumed full
construction risks for the Channel Tunnel project and maintained a reserve capacity of
$1 .8 billion for cost overruns. Half of the $4.9 billion onshore construction work is on a
fixed price contract, while the tunnel itself is on target cost basis. Under the target cost
arrangement, Eurotunnel will pay the contractors actual costs plus a fixed fee of 12.36%
of the target value which is estimated to be $250 million. Also, the contractors will
receive half of all savings if the tunnels are completed below target price. In addition, the
contracts are subject to price adjustments due to unforeseen ground conditions, variations
to specifications, and inflation.
Financing requirements for the Channel Tunnel were subject to three conditions
imposed by the governments: (1) There would be no government guarantees on the loans;
(2) the project is to be 1 00% privately financed on a limited recourse basis whereby the
sponsors are to be paid and the debts serviced by the revenues from the completed project;
and (3) the group must raise 20% in equity which amounts to $1 .72 billion in cash.
Totaling $9.2 billion originally with later documents reporting a $13 billion cost, financing
for this undertaking makes it one of the largest infrastructure projects to ever be privately
managed. A $7.4 billion loan was raised from 209 international banks, the biggest private
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sector syndication in history'. The majority of equity was successfully garnered in four
issues in British pounds and French francs.
5.3.4 Shaiiao Power Plant
The concession for the 2 X 350-MW coal-fired power plant at Shajiao, China, was
signed in 1984. The project was constructed, tested, commissioned, and in full operation
within a period of 33 months. In executing the project, Hopewell utilized a fixed price,
turnkey contract in establishing sole responsibility with the company for its completion.
Hopewell negotiated the turnkey contract with a consortium of equipment suppliers and
contractors on a fixed price, fixed schedule, and mutually agreed quality terms. This
arrangement served to control construction risks. Overall, due to good engineering
design, efficient site supervision, and a dedicated management team, the project was
completed six months ahead of schedule.
Government actions which contributed to the accelerated pace of this project included
the arrangement of an "emergency loan facility" to provide funds to the sponsors in the
case of an unexpected or uncontrollable event. To support profitable operations the
government agreed to purchase a minimum quantity of electricity on a "take-and-pay"
basis and also agreed to pay the sponsoring company a fixed price per kilowatt-hour over
the concession period. On the sponsor's end Hopewell guaranteed the Chinese
government a fixed electricity price per kilowatt-hour for 1 years at a level that was equal
to or lower than the price the Chinese were paying to import power from Hong Kong.
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Since the Chinese economy could not support the project, special arrangements were
made for offshore project financing. Hopewell raised $500 million offshore through
syndicated bank loans involving 46 international institutions. Hopewell also agreed to
invest $17 million equity in the project. In addition, it negotiated deferred credits from the
construction consortium, allowing for repayments over a 7.5 year period thereby easing
the cash flow of the company. To manage the foreign exchange risk in serving the debt,
Hopewell further negotiated for halfof the electricity price to be paid in foreign currency.
The other halfwas agreed to be paid in the nonconvertible Chinese Renminbi and used to
pay for Chinese coal.
5.3.5 Malaysian Toll Road
The Malaysian toll road project was granted to its sponsor under concession in 1988
and was anticipated to be completed in 1995. The roadway forms part of the 800-km
North-South expressway from the Thai border to Singapore. The project company.
United Engineers of Malaysia, formed a new company called PLUS to finance, design,
construct, and operate the expressway.
To support the project the Malaysian government allocated a $235 million loan for
construction costs. This amounted to about 13% of the project's total cost. The loan is
payable over 25 years, including a 15-year grace period and a fixed interest rate of 8% per
annum. The government further underwrote the project in agreeing to provide additional
finance to PLUS should the company experience cash-flow problems due to a drop in
traffic volume in the first 17 years of operation. In addition, PLUS was allowed to
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operate 309 kilometers of the existing expressway and collect toll revenues without having
to purchase the facility. Furthermore, PLUS was given an interest rate guarantee by the
government which allowed for reimbursement should the interest rates increase by more
than 20%.
Financing for the Malaysian expressway was arranged in the conventional debt and
equity structure. Outside ofthe support loan of $235 million, the project company was
responsible for raising $900 million in offshore funds in Hong Kong, Singapore, and
London on a limited recourse to the government. To ease the project's cash flows the
sponsors paid its subcontractors 87% of the contract values in cash and 13% in equity
shares in the project company. The equity shares were only able to be sold at the end of
the construction period. This effectively passed the bulk of the equity risk to the
subcontractors. To service debt, toll rates were mutually agreed upon by the government
and the sponsors to rise to $0.10 per car in 1995 and increase beyond that point in
conjunction with the country's consumer price index.
5.3.6 Bangkok Second Stage Expressway
The 38 kilometer expressway comprises two routes and connects to the existing First
Stage expressway to make a continuous ring of expressways in Central Bangkok. With
the concession signed in 1988, the expressway will be constructed by Bangkok
Expressway, a consortium of foreign and Thai contractors. As of late 1993,
approximately 50% of the work had been completed.
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Guarantees associated with this project include the arrangement where toll revenues
from the existing First Stage expressway are to be shared between the government and
sponsors. Also, partial agreement was given to the consortium to determine suitable toll
rates and carry out any development within the right ofway of the project, subject to
appropriate conditions. In 1988 the toll rate on the Bangkok Second Stage expressway
was established by project sponsors to be $1 .20 per car. The rate is subject to revision
every five years to meet inflation, but the increase cannot be higher than $0.80 for the first
15 years of operation. The sponsor also agreed to share the toll revenues collected from
both expressways with the government at the ratios of 60:40, 50:50, and 40:60 for each of
the nine-year intervals of the concession period after construction.
The financial structure of the Bangkok Expressway project is based on a debt-to-
equity ratio of 80:20. Though the Thai government did not give any financial subsidy, it
agreed to participate in 49% of the equity which comprises about $80 million. Unlike the
other projects discussed, the sponsor company was responsible for the land acquisition
cost of $670 million which was an extra burden to be evaluated in the project's cash flow
analysis. Advance payment for land costs was made by the government, but the sponsor
company must pay back the principal plus interest from the 15 th to the 30th year of the
concession period.
5.4 Conclusion
Documents published after Tiong's original 1990 article indicate that five of these six
projects are in steady operation while one remains under construction by experienced
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contractors. Although the projects were dramatically different in scope, showed different
organization in the structuring of the sponsor companies, invoked several methods of
raising finance, and involved unequal levels of risk, there was an appropriate level of
support from the host governments to improve the probability of success. Overall,
Tiong's research on international projects suggests that the BOT concept, which brings
together the government, sponsors, lenders, investors, and contractors with one common




PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTING BOT CONTRACTS
6.1 Problem Sources
Since this type of contracting procedure has resurfaced only recently, many obstacles
hinder the efficient operation of the tendering process. At this time the basis of project
selection and procedures developed in the public sector for the management of bid
preparation and the tender process seem relatively poorly developed. The broader role
envisioned for the private sector in developing more complex proposals involving project
finance, operation management, and innovation requires additional skills from the public
sector to identify appropriate opportunities for private sector involvement, to identify
marginal advantages between proposals, as well as to develop skills in financial matters
such as project analysis, finance structuring, and risk analysis. Existing skill deficiencies
and lack of experience in public agencies in relation to these areas limits the extent to
which allocative efficiency gains may be achieved from private sector involvement (5:19-
20). Therefore, government itself stands as the largest obstacle inhibiting the efficient
execution of BOT-type contracts, and having acknowledged the need for partnership,
must now reconcile the process of choosing its private sector partner with the need for
public sector accountability (4:60).
Overtly, various legislative and procedural limitations in countries retard the
progression of the BOT tendering process. Because the projects are usually not covered
under an existing political and legal framework, lengthy and extensive negotiations with
the host government are normal. The lack of precedents means that both the government
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and the sponsors are on the learning curve in negotiating over the proposal details. Since
there are no proper guidelines in the allocation of risks between the government and the
concession company, searching for the right balance poses difficulties in negotiations.
This is one of the reasons for governments' frequent indecision in awarding concessions.
As such, sponsors can expect delays and protracted negotiations of up to several years
before the award. Also, since the development ofBOT processes breaks new ground,
opposition inevitably arises. Such opposition stems from political groups striving to
champion the public interest or from competing contractors wishing not to be excluded
from the project (19:219). Finally, because of the lack of sound and decisive policy,
evidence suggests that the principal decision factor for implementing projects is the
availability of funding rather than the fundamental need for infrastructure or the economic
attractiveness of the proposal (5:19). Considering these limitations, government has an
important role to play through improving and facilitating statutory and administrative
arrangements while maintaining competitive disciplines between promoters in managing
the tender process.
6.2 Government's Role in Effective Public/Private Contracting
In establishing procedures for the tender of BOT-type contracts, government must
implement efficient administrative processes and communicate a clear policy concerning
the basis of competition. With regard to administrative procedures, bureaucratic approval
mechanisms and extensive public consultation requirements must be controlled as they can
lead to significant delay, can produce major changes to specifications, and in some cases
can lead to project abandonment. Without limiting these factors the private sector may be
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exposed to significant risks, including excessive planning costs which add to overall
project costs and may even result in project insolvency (5:19).
Concerning competition, gains in productive efficiency from private sector
involvement are expected when bids are obtained from a sufficient number of alternative
promoters in accordance with specifications provided by the government. Initially, the
number of competitive offers evaluated by public agencies must be carefully determined.
If the public sector approves too many bids for tender, competitive efficiencies may be lost
as the high costs involved in preparing a proposal coupled with the low likelihood of
winning a concession may deter bidders. When bidders are short listed only to find
themselves in competition with a large number of others, withdraws are more likely.
Conversely, the public sector fears technically sound and competitive proposals will be
lost by restricting the number of bids. However, research suggests that, given appropriate
skills and incentives to bear risk with the public sector, the benefits of competition can be
achieved from as little as three or four well chosen tenders (5:21). The timing of
competitive comparison in the process is significant as well. If the competition is carried
out early in the development of the project, there is very little hard information available
and a meaningful financial offer is impossible. If the competition is conducted late, most
of the important parameters will already have been fixed, and the efficiency gains expected
from the private sector cannot be realized. Finally, governments must abandon their
traditional means of evaluating bids solely on the basis of a financial offer. Under BOT-
type contracts competition must be carefully balanced over a number of factors including
technical solution, resultant cost benefit, and financial package quality (4:60).
51

Moreover, in initiating competition, governments also need to guard against seeking
bids on projects for which technical feasibility has not been established. Bidding is
expensive and serious bidders will only commit themselves if schemes are viable and the
risks are reasonable. While it may seem desirable or efficient from the government's
perspective to avoid detailed specification in order to allow the private sector flexibility in
offering proposals, such arrangements run the risk of adding to eventual project costs as a
result of the private sector demanding greater returns in accordance with the additional
risks they must bear; may result in projects which do not fulfill real needs; or may dissuade
private sector bidders from participating (5:19).
Overall, shortcomings in the government's capacity to manage the BOT tendering
process have contributed to undermining the private sector's confidence in the long-term
potential for BOT projects (4:60). To effect changes, the consensus thought reflects the
need for governments to undertake all necessary preliminary work, where possible, and to
bear relevant costs prior to calling for bids. Moreover, project solicitations should be
complete without being overly prescriptive and should be designed to foster competition.
In having the feasibility of the project approved by government with a sufficient technical
description designed to leave no doubts as to the objectives of the project, risks of
government abandonment are reduced and an appropriate climate will be set for
competing promoters to offer innovative proposals (5:20). Overall, it is important that the
government demonstrate initiative in spearheading efforts to set substantiated policy with




KEYS TO SUCCESSFUL SPONSORSHIP OF BOT PROJECTS
7.1 Introduction
Winning a BOT concession involves much difficulty. The whole process of project
development is a complex, time-consuming, and expensive task. The financial risk is high.
competition is intense, negotiations are tedious, and opportunity costs are considerable.
Those sponsoring BOT proposals must be willing to take calculated risks and be flexible in
their business dealings. Moreover, bidders must realize government's concern in
accepting BOT proposals and be sensitive to these issues. With these factors in mind.
Tiong. et al.. cite six factors as being critical to the success in winning a BOT contract:
entrepreneurship, picking the right project, a strong team of stakeholders, an imaginative
technical solution, a competitive financial proposal, and the inclusion of special features in
the bid. Table 7.1 summarizes the critical success factors discussed below (19:218-227).
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TABLE 7.1 CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS IN BOT PROJECT EXECUTION
Critical Success Factors Components
Entrepreneurship
Pick the right project
Strong team of stakeholders
Imaginative technical solution
Competitive financial proposal
Special features of bid
calculated risk-taker
cultivating goodwill and relationship with host
government officials
accurate prediction of critical need for project
lack of funds by host government
ideal candidate for privatization
potential to achieve near-monopolistic
advantage for the products/services provided
form a multidisciplinary and multinational team
of stakeholders
leadership from a key entrepreneur or
corporation







reasonably high debt/equity ratio
acceptable tariff levels
short construction and concession periods
forecasts of future demand
imaginative elements that demonstrate altruism
toward host government




The entrepreneurial spirit must exist in any successful company. This is especially
true for companies engaged in pursuing a BOT concession. The BOT concept means
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taking a totally innovative approach to business-development risks. Since the projects are
only temporarily owned or leased by the private sector and since the government wants to
assume as little risk as possible during the concession period, unique entrepreneurial
challenges must be met by the concession company.
7.1.2 Picking the Right Project
One of the crucial factors in winning BOT contracts is the ability to pick the proper
project to initiate. There are a number of conditions that should apply in order to
maximize the chances of the project being commercially viable. Two basic requirements
for success are as follows. First, there should be a demonstrated and accepted need for
the project. Second, there should be a near-monopoly situation in the provision of service.
Utility projects commonly entail a monopolistic situation. However, transportation
projects are more susceptible to competition; therefore, projected demand must be
carefully analyzed. Also, the method of bid origination, be it solicited or speculative,
impacts the desirability of the project. Factors pertaining to the conditions impacting bid
origination are discussed in the following paragraphs.
In the instances where bidding is invited by the government from the private sector,
prospective bidders should try to be cognizant of several factors. First, the proposal
should not be overly technically innovative for the country in which the project is
intended. For example, a nuclear power plant in an underdeveloped country has little
chance of succeeding on a BOT basis. Secondly, the cost of construction should be
reasonably within the means of the private sector. Therefore, the presence of a strong
55

local capital market greatly enhances the probability of the successful tendering of a BOT
project. Thirdly, potential promoters should be aware of legislation governing the BOT
contracting process in a host nation. Administrative delays are greatly reduced if enabling
legislation or precedents exist in the country. For example, countries such as Ireland,
France, and Malaysia all have enabling legislation concerning BOT concessions which has
led to a positive climate for businesses. Conversely, countries like the United Kingdom
usually require a special bill to be passed by parliament to enable BOT processes. This has
discouraged businesses from competing for BOT concessions. Fourthly, there should be a
small number of bidders. If there are more than three bidders, promoters may feel it is not
worthwhile to compete. Finally, the political ability of the host government to support the
BOT concept is important. Without such political will there is a strong chance of failure.
In cases where a promoter initiates a speculative proposal to the government, the
following factors should be considered. Most importantly, the policy of the host
government concerning intellectual property must be understood. Ideally, the promoter
would be the one to capitalize on the idea. However, if there is a strong chance that the
government will use the promoter's idea as the basis of an invited competitive tender, the
bidder must be confident of winning even in the face of competition. Overall, a thorough
investigation should be conducted up front to establish the exact needs of the public




7.1.3 Strong Team of Stakeholders
From a private sponsor's standpoint, a combination of diverse skills and talents is
essential in successfully executing a BOT project. Accordingly, a strong multidisciplinary
team must be formed at the beginning of the process. At first, the team should consist of
members possessing the requisite technical and financial engineering skills to initiate the
project. Should the team pass the government's initial evaluations and proceed to the
short list of bidders, the team should be further strengthened by adding other stakeholders,
such as project and construction managers, financial and legal advisors, specialist
subcontractors, and suppliers. Also, the demographic composition of the group is of
extreme importance. Therefore, care should be taken to include local stakeholders from
the host country to satisfy the inherent political aspects of typical BOT projects.
In addition to technical skills. Tiong. et al., have identified eight professional and
personal characteristics that, according to their research, are essential in establishing a
strong consortium: (1) Acceptance of a common goal; (2) capacity for analysis of
country-related parameters such as political risk and government commitment; (3)
effective negotiating strategy; (4) financial strength to bear the development costs; (5)
staying power to meet the huge demand in management time; (6) desire to successfully
carry out the project with a vision and will to persist against all odds; (7) capacity to
supplant disappointment with renewed rigor; and (8) suppleness in relation and
submerging of potential conflicts of interests among the different parties in the consortium.
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7.1.4 Imaginative Technical Solution
The element of an imaginative design must provide a simple solution to the needs of
the project. Combining existing technologies or systems in new ways is often the key to
innovative solutions as governments and investors alike may fear untested technical or
politically sensitive proposals. For example, the proposal submitted by Japan's Kumagai
Gumi for the Eastern Harbor Crossing project in Hong Kong attracted the government's
attention because of its innovative concept of a combined rail and road tunnel to relieve
both traffic congestion and train overcrowding during peak travel periods. Another
proposal submitted by Kumagai Gumi in a joint venture with Australia's Transfield for the
Sydney Tunnel project was also highly regarded by the government because of its
innovative approach. The idea of a tunnel was not new as earlier proposals had failed
because of the expense of building and the political sensitivity of acquiring private land to
execute the project. The proposal by Kumagai Gumi and Transfield was unique in that it
submitted the idea of linking to existing roads at either end of the Sydney Bridge thereby
reducing construction expenses and eliminating the need to acquire private land and
demolish existing facilities.
7.1.5 Competitive Financial Proposal
Under the BOT model the commercial and financial considerations, rather than the
technical elements, are likely to be the key factors affecting the final determination of the
winning concession. As such, the following elements must be considered by the sponsors
with regard to developing a sound and competitive financial proposal for a project:
58

(1) Low construction costs; (2) reasonably high debt to equity ratio; (3) acceptable tariff
levels; (4) short construction and concession period; and (5) forecasts of future demand.
The proposed tariff rate is one of the factors most keenly scrutinized by government
during the selection process. Many times a project will operate in some form of monopoly
and the government has political reason to regulate the tariff to ensure that it is justifiable.
From the point of view of consumers, tariffs need to be reasonably low so as not to be
overly burdensome. From the standpoint of investors and lenders, tariffs need to be
reasonably high so that revenues are capable of covering the project's costs and providing
adequate compensation for shouldering the associated risks. Balancing these conflicting
interests is a very delicate task for project sponsors. Overall, the sponsors should not
hope to make excessive profits; however, revenues and returns should be commensurate
with the risks taken.
7.1.6 Special Features
In the projects analyzed by Tiong, et al, the winning bids inevitably contained at least
one imaginative element making the proposal unique. Features setting the winning
proposals apart from others were diverse, but two common themes persisted. First,
successful proposals demonstrated the altruism of the bidders by showing that those
promoting the project were not motivated by the prospect of early profit-taking. Second,
winning proposals addressed the specific fears the host government had regarding the
project under consideration. Common fears felt by government include foreign ownership
of local companies and overpricing in the operation phase. Moreover, governments may
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be suspicious of whether the promoters will experience a gain that they are not disclosing.
Overall, successful bids must take the means necessary to mitigate the concerns of the
public sector.
The proposal submitted by the British consortium for the Queen Elizabeth II Bridge
project in London is an example of a successful bid containing the type of special feature
discussed in the preceding paragraph. A clause provided in the proposal stipulates that if
the project's loans are repaid early then the transfer of the assets to the government will
take place early as well. This clause serves to show that the project's promoters do not
intend to exploit the project to generate excessive profits. A positive outcome was
therefore achieved by all concerned in that the promoter won the concession and the
government received assurances that the promoter would not be unjustly enriched at
public expense.
7.2 Conclusion
BOT project sponsors must realize that the process of winning a project is fraught
with uncertainties and risk. Pursuing a BOT contract requires the development of a team
possessing exceptional technical and financial skills, an entrepreneurial spirit, and the
determination to persevere. Focusing on the six factors described above should enable a





BOT contracts are increasingly being used across a number of sectors by governments
in their drive to privatize major public projects. Primarily, governments see BOT schemes
as a method of financing the construction of projects without the need for a direct
sovereign guarantee of the loans. Furthermore, experiences documented by OECD
countries and recorded in Public Management Occasional Papers suggest that productive,
allocative, and dynamic efficiency gains are possible from the wider involvement of the
private sector in infrastructure provision. These gains can be expected to result from the
application of greater market disciplines to both individual project selection and aggregate
investment choices for the public sector as a whole; from innovation by the private sector
in project design and implementation; and from the circumvention of cumbersome public
sector procurement regulations which have historically imposed delays in design, finance,
and construction, and have subsequently increased the costs of projects (5:23).
However, benefits of privatization will not be realized automatically. Obtaining the
rewards will require innovation and skilled management on the part of the public sector.
Securing potential efficiency gains will require the establishment of sound acquisition
processes. Proposals should be solicited only after preliminary planning approvals and
public consultation requirements have been met. The solicitation itself should be
performance related so as to leave no doubt as to the requirements for the project, yet
should allow room for innovative proposals. Once proposals are selected for
implementation, an appropriate balance of risks must be obtained through the offering of
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guarantees and incentives by both the public and private sector. Overall, to ensure these
benefits a change in attitude allowing the public and private sector to evolve from their
traditional roles in project execution must come about. Once this philosophy is fully
accepted, appropriate procedural modifications can be effected.
Real experimenting with the use of markets in and by public administrations provides
an irreplaceable way of testing how the public sector can be better managed (5:24). This
dynamic has already shown itself to be quite powerful in promoting greater efficiency by
expanding perspectives on what can be tried. In the past this has been exemplified
in many sectors where market type mechanisms have been employed: the introduction of
competition in postal, telephone, and telecommunications services: the design and
implementation of international competition with hospital and school systems; and the
establishment of competition through deregulation of airlines and privatization of airports.
Given time and careful management similar benefits should be obtainable from
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These Guidelines for Conceptual Project Proposals (Guide-
lines) initiate the second stage of a two-stage screening
and selection process (see Attachment 3) . Those who have
been determined to be qualified during the Request for
Qualifications (RFQ) first stage are invited to submit one
or more conceptual project proposals for toll revenue
transportation projects (highway, bridge, tunnel, monorail,
light rail, etc.) in the State of California. While no
State or federal funds are available for these proposals,
local governments may participate.
Assembly Bill No. 680 (Attachment 1) , which was effective
July 10, 1989, authorizes the California Department of
Transportation (Caltrans) to enter into agreements with the
private sector to grant exclusive development rights to
construct four (4) transportation projects and receive toll
revenues for up to 3 5 years. Associated Caltrans airspace
may be leased to acquire related value-added revenues for
up to 99 years. This legislation authorizes Caltrans to
use its power of condemnation on behalf of these projects.
However, condemnation will be used only as a last resort,
and, if used, its use will comply with existing statutes,
and Caltrans 1 policies and procedures.
Transportation privatization projects have been defined by
AB 2483 (see Attachment 2) as public works, for purposes of
prevailing wages.
The State is seeking specific proposals which meet (1) the
legislative intent expressed in Assembly Bills 680 and
2483, (2) applicable portions of the General and Specific
Goals of California Transportation Direction (see Attach-
ment 4) , and (3) the specific requirements of these
Guidelines.
A Caltrans committee will review and evaluate the proposals
submitted. Final selection of the four best proposals and
a priority ranking of all other proposals will be made by
the Director of the California Department of Transporta-
tion. It is anticipated that exclusive proposal develop-
ment agreements will be negotiated with the four selected
proposers.
Except for local government contacts, proposers are






promote their specific proposal (s) except in their
submittal to Caltrans.
REQUIRED DELIVERABLES
Conceptual project proposals must include the following
items
:
A. Description of Proposer
B. Concept Report
C. Preliminary Environmental Evaluation
D. Financial Plan
E. Schedule for Development
F. Documentation of Support
G. State Services Desired
H. Support for State Civil Rights Objectives
I. Proposal Filing Fee
The following descriptions cover details of each item
required. Note that these requirements are the minimum
necessary; additional information may be submitted with
your proposal if you believe it will be useful in Caltrans'
proposal evaluation and selection.
A. Description of Proposer
A completed "Developer Questionnaire" (Questionnaire)
,
see Attachment 5, was part of your successful response
to our November 1989 RFQ. Your response to these
Guidelines must update the information previously
submitted in the following manner.
Respond to Questionnaire section A (Identification of
the company or consortium) as follows:
1. Provide the information requested under items 1
and 3 through 9 for any companies added to your





or lead organization which you previously iden-
tified under item 2; your organization is one of
the limited number which will be allowed to submit
proposals)
.




Update the information which you previously
submitted under items 1 and 3 through 9 (e.g.,
revised names, addresses or telephone numbers;
revisions to the business structure or relation-
ships between companies; changes in the joint
venture partners or equity interests in your
proposal; revisions to your roles, experience,
responsibilities, organization, etc.)
Respond to Questionnaire section B, items 1 through 3
and 5 as follows:
4 Provide the information requested for any
companies added to your group.
5. Provide updated information for your original
group where appropriate (e.g., more recent
financial statements, larger loans secured,
additions to your original list of financial
partners and lenders)
.
The following new information, similar to that pre-
viously provided in the Questionnaire, section C but
specifically related to your proposal, is to be
included in your response to these Guidelines.
6. Provide a statement addressing the developer's
ability to manage a project team including
environmental, engineering design, right of way,
financing, construction, toll operations, and
maintenance for projects similar in size and type
to the one being proposed.
7. Provide a description of project experience in
major transportation facilities of the size and
type being proposed (both domestic and inter-
national)
,
company or consortium roles and respon-
sibilities in the projects, and references






8. Provide a description of the ownership status of
each project listed above.
9. Describe the company's or consortium's experience
in long-term management and operation of toll
revenue transportation facilities for projects
similar in size and type to the one being
proposed.
10. Describe your experience in the design, instal-
lation, and operation of modern automated traffic
operations, Automatic Vehicle Identification
(AVI) , Electronic Toll Collection (ETC) systems or
any other relevant technical innovations which you
plan to utilize in your proposal.
B. Concept Report
The Concept Report must provide sufficient detail to
clearly describe your proposal and to allow its evalu-
ation relative to the other proposals. As a minimum,
the Report should contain the following information.
(This outline is for a highway facility. Comparable
data will be required for other transportation modes.)
1. Briefly describe the proposed project (location and
limits) and its purpose; include suitable mapping
(1" = 100' is desirable).
2. Provide a clear statement of the transportation
services that are being proposed; include a
description of the existing State-owned transpor-
tation facility which would be supplemented.
3. Discuss engineering concepts.
a. Geometric cross-section
b. Design designation
ADT(19xx): estimated average daily traffic






ADT(19xx+20) : average daily traffic for
future year ( 20 years
hence) * used as target in
design
Note, it is expected that additional future traffic
projections will be required to satisfy Financial Plan
requirements
.
DHV: two-way design hourly volume
D: percent of DHV in direction of heavier flow
T: Truck increment as a percentage of the DHV
V: design speed in MPH
c. Interchange locations and type
d. Toll collection concept
4. Identify and describe the alternatives (include




5. Briefly describe right of way requirements
a. Needs (acres, width of corridor, etc.)
b. Utility relocations
c. Railroad involvement, and/or relocations
d. Relocation assistance requirements (residen-
tial, commercial)
e. Airspace usage (reserved utility corridor,







f. Hazardous waste potential
6. Discuss compliance with Caltrans ' design standards
as contained in appropriate manuals. Include
appropriate statements or materials to show the
intent to comply with standards such as:




7. Agency Permits or Approvals
Identify agency permits or approvals that will be
required if proposal is to be implemented.
Following is a list of permits or approvals
commonly required for typical transportation
projects.
a. Local/Regional
1) City, County, or Regional Planning Agency
[including Local Coastal Plan permit, and
in the San Francisco Bay Area the Bay
Conservation & Development Commission
(BCDC) ]
.
2) Permit to Enter on private lands
3) Regional Water Quality Control Board
4) Airport Coordination
5) Freeway Agreement
6) Native American Coordination
b. State






2) California Fish and Game (Resource protec-
tion; State endangered species; Fish & Game
Code Section 1601/3 Agreement)
3) Department of Health Services (Hazardous
Waste)
4) Department of Transportation (Encroachment
Permit, Freeway Agreement)
5) California Transportation Commission (Route
Adoption, New Connection to Freeway)
c. Federal
1) Corps of Engineers (Clean Water Act,
Section 404 Permit, includes wetlands)
2) U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (Endangered
Species)
3) Environmental Protection Agency (Wetlands,
Hazardous Waste)
4) Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)
5) U.S. Coast Guard (Bridges over navigable
waters)
Provide capital cost estimates, identified by major
components, for your proposal
a. Basis of estimate and how derived
b. Right of way costs
c. Construction costs identified by major
components; e.g., grading, drainage, structures
structural section, electrical, environmental
mitigation, etc.
Discuss proposed connections or any other involve-
ment with Federal-aid highways and whether National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) documents or FHWA
design approvals are required. Discuss proposed







C. Preliminary Environmental Evaluation
The purpose of the preliminary environmental evaluation
is to (1) describe how the proposed project would
further California's environmental goals; (2) identify
environmental resources and issues which may affect
development of the proposal into a project; (3)
identify, for all proposed alternatives, mitigation
measures needed to avoid or reduce significant environ-
mental impacts. The level of detail provided is
expected to be consistent with the proposal description
provided in the Concept Report.
1. Environmental Goals
Briefly describe how the proposed project furthers
California's environmental policies as described in
the California Environmental Quality Act (Public
Resources Code Sections 21000-21002 are attached,
see Attachment 6)
.
2. Potential Environmental Resources and Issues
Provide a brief paragraph for each affected
environmental resource or issue expected to be
significant. The following list contains typical
resources that may be affected by transportation
projects.
a. Physical
1) Topography change, seismic exposure,
erodibility
2) Air, noise, energy, solid waste, use of
natural resources
3) Wetlands, water, groundwater, and
floodplains
b. Biological
1) Fish and wildlife; species and habitat
2) Vegetation







1) Land use and growth
2) Business, industry, economy, employment
3) Population characteristics, housing,
neighborhoods
4) Schools, public facilities
5) Heritage resources
6) Recreation, park land, open space
7) Aesthetics, visual, scenic resources
3 . Potential Mitigation Measures
Briefly describe potential mitigation measures to
be incorporated in the proposed project to avoid or
reduce significant environmental impacts.
D. Financial Plan
The Financial Plan must provide sufficient detail to
demonstrate a reasonable basis for funding the
conceptual project. The level of detail provided
should be consistent with the level of development of
the balance of the conceptual proposal.
Final selection of any proposal will be dependent, in
part, on the adequacy of the general Financial Plan,
see IV. Selection Criteria of these Guidelines. In
this regard, Caltrans intends to provide a list of
prequalified companies who will be able to analyze, and
offer an opinion as to the adequacy of, any Financial
Plans submitted in response to these Guidelines.
The statement of opinion to be required from the
prequalified financial consultants is:
"It is our opinion, as of
1990, that the financial plan contained in the
proposer's conceptual proposal appears to be
based on reasonable financial assumptions
consistent with the level of analysis provided






development proposal, and as a result provides
a reasonable basis for the further development
of the conceptual proposal. It is our opinion
that the financial plan, at the conceptual
level, adequately identifies the source (s)
,
type(s), amount (s), and schedule of financing
based on conditions that currently prevail in
the capital and debt markets, and which are
contemplated at specific stages in the
development of the conceptual proposal."
All costs for the financial review and obtaining an
opinion of adequacy will be charged directly to the
project proposer by the financial consultant. A
description of typical costs for each prequalified
company is available from Caltrans.
The Financial Plan submitted must provide the infor-
mation necessary to obtain the required opinion of
adequacy. It is expected that this opinion can be
provided in a reasonable and timely manner. It will
help the proposal, and assist the financial consultant
selected, if the general Financial Plan is organized to
match, if appropriate, the structure of "Representative
Tasks for Consideration". See Attachment 7.
All of the companies placed on the Caltrans list of
prequalified financial consultants have been informed
that they must be totally independent from any proposer
responding to these Guidelines. Any financial consul-
tant providing an opinion of the adequacy of a Finan-
cial Plan as described above will be required to
certify the following:
"We certify that we have no current or contem-
plated involvement with any individual or
company identified in a conceptual project
proposal that would constitute a conflict of
interest. This includes, but is not limited
to, participating in a consortium, serving as a
consultant to a consortium, serving as a
funding source or underwriter, or being a
subsidiary, parent or affiliate of a company
involved in a conceptual project proposal."
If the proposed financial plan is deficient and a






financial consultant is to list the areas of deficiency
that must be corrected to obtain a favorable opinion.
The project proposer will be given an opportunity to
correct the deficiencies and resubmit the revised plan
to the financial consultant. To maintain the integrity
of an independent review, the financial consultant
performing the review is precluded from providing
consulting assistance necessary to correct the
identified deficiencies.
E. Schedule for Development
Provide a schedule listing the important events and the
proposed dates associated with each of these events.
The schedule should start with notification by Caltrans
that the proposal has been selected as one of the four
best candidates for a demonstration project and extend
at least until the projected date on which the facility
would be opened to traffic.
Briefly discuss proposed schedule. Include in this
discussion the proposed approach for managing the
schedule, strategy for dealing with any unanticipated
delays (e.g., unexpected environmental problems, late
delivery of required permits, project related liti-
gation, etc. )
.
F. Documentation of Support
Provide evidence of support for proposal. Following is
a representative, but not all-inclusive, list of items:
1. resolutions by affected local governments
2. resolutions by affected governmental agencies
3. letters of support from government officials
4
.
letters of support from other interests
G. State Services Desired
Provide a listing of any optional, reimbursable
services which the State will be requested to provide
under separate contract for the proposed project. Such






Caltrans (e.g. , traffic projections for a highway seg-
ment or alternative which Caltrans had not previously
developed) , long-term services desired from State
agencies (e.g. , highway maintenance by Caltrans or
police services by the Highway Patrol for an operating
tollway) . Include the approximate start and finish
dates which would be expected for any such optional
services contracted from the State.
Note that there will be additional reimbursable Cal-
trans services related to the project which will not be
optional; see III. A., Terms and Conditions of these
Guidelines. These services are those required for
protection of the State's interest (e.g., project
design and construction oversight, auditing, etc.).
H. Support for State Civil Rights Objectives
Describe actions which would be taken under the
proposal in support of State civil rights objectives.
Such actions would include, but not be limited to, use
of Disadvantaged Business Enterprises (DBEs) and the
use of minority and women employees.
I. Proposal Filing Fee
A check for $50,000 payable to the California Depart-
ment of Transportation must be included with each
project sponsor's proposal(s). The required filing fee
is $50,000 per sponsor; no additional fee will be
required for sponsors choosing to submit more than one
project proposal.
Checks accompanying the four best proposals, see
Section IV., Selection Criteria of these Guidelines,
will be deposited when proposal development agreements
are signed by Caltrans and the related proposer. These
funds will be used to offset Caltrans' costs for per-
forming proposal evaluation and selection. Any of
these funds in excess of Caltrans' evaluation and
selection costs will be placed in an account to offset
costs for future Caltrans services required for protec-
tion of the State's interests, as described in
section III. A. of these Guidelines.
A portion of the filing fee accompanying lower-ranked






proposal evaluation costs. The retention will be
$5,000 per project proposal (i.e., a sponsor submitting
two project proposals will have $10,000 retained).
Refunds to initially unsuccessful proposers will occur
when the proposal development agreements discussed
above have been successfully executed. In the event
that an initially lower ranked proposal is selected at
a later time, new checks in the amount of the refund,
payable to the California Department of Transportation,
will be required.
III. TERMS AND CONDITIONS
The development of selected proposals into an actual
transportation facility will be subject to the following:
A. Development must be performed and completed at no cost
to the State. In addition to all other proposal
development costs, sponsors for the four proposals
ultimately selected for such development will be
responsible for Caltrans costs related to protection of
the State's interest. Typical costs of this type would
be those associated with proposal selection, review of
right of way acquisition, project design and construc-
tion oversight activities, review of maintenance pro-
grams, and auditing of development, construction and
operational costs.
The State's policy is to recover full costs whenever
goods or services are provided for others. This policy
is to be followed in all cases except when statutes
prohibit full cost recovery. All State costs that are
reimbursable by developer shall include all costs as
specified in Section 8752.1 of the State Administrative
Manual. In addition, all obligations of the State are
contingent upon the Department having the budgetary
authority to perform the work.
B. Any debt incurred as a consequence of these activities
shall be the responsibility of proposal sponsors and
their associates or subordinates. There shall be no
lien, either real or implied, against the State for
such debt.
C. Development must comply with all applicable laws and






1. Assembly Bills 680 and 2483
2. The Political Reform Act (California's Government
Code section 86109)
3. California licensing requirements (e.g., engineer-
ing and contracting)
4. Local real estate zoning regulations
5. State standards for design, construction, main-
tenance and operations, including police services.
6. Public Records Act (California Government Code
Sections 6250 et seq)
7. Caltrans' power of condemnation (California Code of
Civil Procedures Section (1230.010 et seq)
8. Applicable references noted in II. B. 7. of these
Guidelines
9. Applicable non-discrimination requirements, includ-
ing, but not limited to, Labor Code Section 1735.
D. Caltrans expects to enter into exclusive proposal
development agreements with the four (4) sponsors
providing the best proposals. These agreements would
provide proposal sponsors with a time-limited option
for developing their proposal into an acceptable
project and would inhibit Caltrans from building
competing facilities during the option period.
E. Development activities must demonstrate a good faith
effort to conform to State civil rights objectives.
F. Caltrans reserves the right to modify these Guidelines
including, but not limited to, specified deadlines and
to reject any or all submissions for any reason without
incurring any cost or liability.
IV. SELECTION CRITERIA
Proposals submitted in response to these Guidelines will be






A. Transportation service provided by proposal (20
points)
.
B. Degree to which proposal encourages economic prosperity
and makes overall good business sense (10 points)
.
C. Degree of local support for proposal (15 points)
.
D. Relative ease of proposal implementation (15 points)
.
E. Relative experience and expertise of the proposal
sponsors and their support team on similar projects (15
points)
F. Degree to which proposal supports the State's Environ-
mental Quality and Energy Conservation Goal, see
Attachment 4 — Specific Goal III (10 points)
.
G. Degree to which non-toll revenues support proposal
costs; note, such support is considered positive
(5 points)
.
H. Degree of technical innovation associated with
proposal; e.g., use of AVI, ETC, modern automated
traffic operations, differential tolls and peak-hour
pricing flexibility, provision of low- or no-main-
tenance features (10 points)
.
I. Degree of proposal's support for achieving the civil
rights objectives of the State as expressed in Public
Contract Code sections 10115-10115.10 regarding the
utilization of Minority and Women Business Enterprise
(10 points)
.
A proposal which achieves the highest possible evaluation
for all nine criteria would receive a score of 110 points.
Proposals will be reviewed and evaluated, using the
criteria listed above, by a proposal review committee
approved by the Caltrans Director. The review committee
members will be determined after receipt of proposals.
Proposals, along with review committee evaluations and
recommendations, will be reviewed by the Privatization
Advisory Steering Committee and subsequently submitted to
the Director for his selection of the four (4) best
proposals and a priority ranking of all other proposals.






more meetings with the Caltrans review committee and/or
Director during the proposal evaluation period.
In addition to the evaluation and selection process
described above, the four best proposals must obtain the
independent opinion of adequacy described in II. D.
Financial Plan.
It is Caltrans' intention that evaluation of conceptual
project proposals not be influenced by the presence or
absence of an independent opinion of the Financial Plan's
adequacy at the time the proposal is submitted. In order
to assist the Department to avoid this potential bias,
project proposers shall submit in a sealed envelope either:
1. a completed financial review together with a signed
opinion of adequacy by a financial consultant selected
from the Caltrans prequalified list, or
2. blank sheets of paper if they elect to defer their
financial review until after the selection of the four
best projects.
The outside of the sealed envelope shall be labeled
"Financial Consultant Review" and must indicate the name of
the qualified proposer.
Sealed envelopes will not be opened until all proposals
have been evaluated and the four best selected. Condi-
tional selection will be made subject to obtaining an
independent opinion of financial plan adequacy. After
conditional selection, the financial review envelopes for
the best four projects will be opened. Those containing a
signed opinion of financial plan adequacy will receive
final approval . Those without a favorable adequacy opinion
will remain conditional selections until an opinion is
received.
Retention of a financial consultant after receiving
Caltrans' conditional selection as a "best proposal" may
delay execution of exclusive proposal development agree-








COMPANIES AND CONSORTIA WISHING TO PARTICIPATE IN
THIS PROCESS MUST DELIVER THE REQUIRED TEN (10)
COPIES OF THEIR SUBMISSION, ALONG WITH THE REQUIRED
FILING FEE, ON OR BEFORE AUGUST 1. 1990 AT 5:00 P.M.








ALL SUBMITTALS MUST BE PREPARED ENTIRELY IN ENGLISH AND BE
SIGNED BY A REPRESENTATIVE OF ALL COMPANIES IDENTIFIED AS
MEMBERS OF A CONSORTIUM.
UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCE WILL RESPONSES RECEIVED AFTER THE












Roles and Responsibilffles of

































Effective as ofJuly 16, 1993
State Route 91 Median Improvements
Orange and Riverside Counties, California
tUbOTW
State of California California Private
Department of Transportation Transportation Company, L.P.




THIS AMENDED AND RESTATED DEVELOPMENT FRANCHISE AGREEMENT FOR
THE STATE ROUTE 91 MEDIAN IMPROVEMENTS is made and entered into effective as of
June 30, 1993, by and between CALIFORNIA PRIVATE TRANSPORTATION
COMPANY, L.P., a limited partnership formed and existing under the laws of the State of
California (together with its transferees, successors and assigns as hereinafter provided, "CPTC"),
and THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, acting by and
through the Director of Transportation (together with its successors and assigns as hereinafter
provided, "Caltrans").
WHEREAS, the California Legislature has passed Assembly Bill 680 as Chapter 107, Statutes of
1989, adding Section 143 to the California Streets and Highways Code, as amended by Assembly
Bill 3396, Chapter 1115, Statutes of 1990 (the "Enabling Act"; all other capitalized terms not
otherwise defined shall have the meanings specified in Article 2 hereof unless otherwise required
by the context) relating to transportation facilities, which Enabling Act was approved by the
Governor on July 10, 1989, and filed with the Secretary of State on July 10, 1989; and
WHEREAS, the Legislature found and declared: (i) that it is essential for the economic well-
being of the State of California and the maintenance of a high quality of life that the people of the
State of California have an efficient transportation system; (ii) that public sources of revenues to
provide an efficient transportation system have not kept pace with California's growing
transportation needs, and alternative funding sources should be developed to augment or
supplement available public sources of revenue; (iii) that an important alternative is privately
funded Build-Operate-Transfer projects whereby private entities obtain exclusive development
agreements to build, with private funds, all or a portion of public transportation facilities for the
citizens of California; (iv) that during the term of the development agreement the private entity
will have the right to lease the facility from the State and charge tolls sufficient to retire the
private investment in the project (including a reasonable profit), operate and police the facility,
maintain the facility, retire any outstanding bonds issued in support of the facility, and to make
lease payments to the State; (v) that privately financed projects allow for joint ventures of private
and public entities that take advantage of private sector efficiencies in designing and building
transportation projects, allow for rapid formation of capital necessary for funding transportation
projects, more quickly bring reductions in congestion in existing transportation corridors, require
continued compliance with environmental requirements and applicable State and federal laws that
all publicly financed projects must address, and offer the traveling public alternate route selections
in project areas; and (vi) that Caltrans should be permitted and encouraged to test the feasibility of
building privately funded transportation facilities by developing four demonstration projects, and
WHEREAS, the Enabling Act provides that such exclusive development agreements shall provide
for the lease of the privately constructed transportation facility to the private entity for an
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operating period of up to thirty-five years, after which such facility shall completely revert to the
State at no charge to the State; and
WHEREAS, the Enabling Act authorizes CaJtrans to exercise any power possessed by it with
respect to development and construction of State transportation projects to facilitate the
development and construction of the private transportation projects authorized thereunder; and
WHEREAS, the Enabling Act requires that the agreements for maintenance and police services
entered into pursuant thereto shall provide for full reimbursement for services rendered by
Caltrans or other State agencies to the extent such services are utilized; and
WHEREAS, the Enabling Act provides that the agreements entered into thereunder shall
authorize the private entity to impose tolls for the use of a facility constructed by it and shall
require over the term of the lease with respect thereto that toll revenues be applied to the payment
of the private entity's capital outlay costs for the project, the costs associated with operations toll
collection and administration of the facility, reimbursement for maintenance and police services
and a reasonable return on investment to the private entity; and
WHEREAS the Enabling Act provides that the agreements shall require any excess toll revenue
to be applied to any indebtedness incurred by the private entity with respect to the project or be
paid into the State Highway Account, or both; and
WHEREAS, the Enabling Act requires that the plans and specifications for each project
constructed thereunder shall comply with Caltrans' standards for Caltrans' projects and that a
facility constructed by and leased to a private entity shall, during the term of the lease, be deemed
to be a pan of the State highway system for purposes of identification, maintenance, enforcement
of traffic laws and for the purposes ofDivision 3.6 (commencing with Section 810) of Title 1 of









1990 Caltrans entered into a Development Franchise Agreement
with California Private Transportation Corporation, a California corporation (the "1990 Franchise
Agreement"); and
WHEREAS, the parties amended the 1990 Franchise Agreement pursuant to amendments dated
as of January 8, 1992, January 24, 1992, and February 19, 1992 (the "Amendments"); and
WHEREAS, as ofDecember 3 1, 1990 Caltrans and CPTC had made numerous findings and
determinations, as set forth in Sections 1.9 through 1.28 of the 1990 Franchise Agreement which
are hereby restated and incorporated by reference herein; and
WHEREAS, as ofMarch 26, 1992, California Private Transportation Corporation assigned afl of
its right, title and interest in and to the Franchise Agreement to CPTC, pursuant to the authc—y
granted m Section 17(a)(1) of the 1990 Franchise Agreement- and
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WHEREAS, Caltrans and CPTC desire to amend and restate the 1990 Franchise Agreement in its
entirety to reflect the Amendments and certain other modifications to the Agreement which have
been agreed upon by Caltrans and CPTC.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and covenants herein contained,
and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby
acknowledged, it is agreed by and between the parties hereto that they will comply with the terms




Article 3. Franchise Terms
3.1. Grant of Franchise.
In accordance with the Enabling Act, Caltrans hereby grants CPTC an exclusive, irrevocable
(subject to the express termination rights under Section 3.5 hereof) franchise to perform basic
data collection, research, experimental management, and resource evaluation activities as part of
the environmental study, and to design, develop, acquire, construct, install and operate the Private
Transportation Project, and each Facility (including such related improvements as may be required
in the transition areas and zones described in Exhibit A hereto), in accordance with the terms of
this Agreement; provided, however, that such grant shall not relieve or exempt CPTC from any
permit or approval requirements or zoning restrictions otherwise applicable to the Private
Transportation Project or any Facility; provided, further, that CPTC shall have no right hereunder
to commence construction of the Private Transportation Project or any Facility until Caltrans has
fulfilled its obligations under CEQA related to such Facility and any required Notices of
Determination have been filed.
3.2. Exclusivity of Rights.
In order to protect the exclusivity of the contract, property and franchise rights granted to CPTC
herein and in any Lease, and to safeguard the economic viability of the Private Transportation
Project and CPTC's substantial private capital investment therein, Caltrans covenants and agrees
as follows:
(a) Caltrans shall not during the term of this Agreement grant or convey any franchise or other
similar regulatory or contract rights to any party other than CPTC in connection with, and
will not finance with public funds within Caltrans' discretionary control (either directly or
by provision of governmental guarantees of a financial or commercial nature) the design,
financing, construction or operation within the Absolute Protection Zone of any public
transportation facility, project or program; provided, however, that this covenant shall not
apply to any of the following:
(i) Any rail passenger systems, except those designed to carry automobiles;
(ii) Any improvement to the State Transportation Facility the principal purpose of which
is to resolve traffic safety problems, even if such improvement results in incidental
increases in the vehicle capacity of the State Transportation Facility; provided,
however, that while Caltrans shall in no event be proscribed by this Agreement from
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improvements shall result in an addition to the State Transportation Facility of any
through lanes unless permitted by clause (iii) below;
(iii) Any improvement to the State Transportation Facility solely to effect expanded free
capacity for HOV-3's by the addition of one or more outside through lanes in either
or both directions and the concurrent redesignation ofthe innermost lane or lanes
adjacent to the Private Transportation Project as HOV-3 lanes. Caltrans has no
present plans to construct such HOV-3 lanes on the State Transportation Facility. If
Caltrans constructs or allows others to construct such lanes on the State
Transportation Facility within Orange County prior to the termination of the
Franchise, access to such lanes shall initially be set by Caltrans in consultation with
CPTC, the Orange County Transportation Authority, and the Riverside County
Transportation Commission, and supported by operational and technical analyses,
and such access shall not be modified without similar consultation. Such lanes shall
be designed and operated so as to not permanently or materially interfere with the
operation of the Private Transportation Project. In consideration of CPTC's
undertakings with respect to Authorized HOV-3's as set forth in Exhibit A, Caltrans
agrees that construction of additional HOV lanes (other than HOV-3 lanes) on the
State Transportation Facility shall be subject to the covenants of Subsection 3.2 (a)
if it presents material economic competition or otherwise might reasonably be
expected to materially impair CPTC's realization of the Reasonable Return on
Investment. This provision shall not be deemed in any way to affect the definitions
of high occupancy vehicles in Riverside or Orange counties or limit Caltrans 1
exercise of its police powers;
(iv) Any installation of IVHS. Such IVHS shall not materially interfere with any AVI
installed by CPTC;
(v) Any facility, project or program which does not present economic competition (as
described in Subsection (b) below) to the Private Transportation Project; and
(vi) Any improvement, project or facility that may be constructed within the Absolute
Protection Zone provided it is not open to the public prior to the Private
Transportation Project Lease termination.
(b) For purposes of determining whether a proposed facility, project or program presents
economic competition to the Private Transportation Project, there shall be a rebuttable
presumption that any such facility, project or program which is, if applicable, designed to
Expressway or higher specifications, and which facilitates transportation movements:
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(ii) In a more or less north-to-south direction (and/or vice versa) does not present such
economic competition, unless such facility, project or program can be shown to
provide alternate west-to-east (and/or vice versa) traffic flow in the Absolute
Protection Zone.
There shall be a rebuttable presumption that any such facility, project or program which is,
if applicable, designed to less than Expressway standards does not present such economic
competition.
(c) Caltrans shall, within thirty days of receiving notice or becoming aware of any proposal by
the Legislature, the Commission, or any other state or local governmental or quasi-
governmental body or private entity concerning the development, design, construction,
installation, implementation, ownership or operation of a transportation facility, project,
program or regulation within or directly affecting the Notification Zone, will use best
efforts to inform CPTC with respect to such proposal. Failure to inform CPTC within
thirty days, unless intentional, shall not constitute a Caltrans Default.
(d) Caltrans shall explain to the Commission and to State and local governmental and quasi-
governmental bodies and officials the impacts of developing transportation facilities,
projects, programs and regulations which might reasonably be anticipated to present
economic competition (as described in Subsection (b) above) to the Private Transportation
Project or to affect adversely the Gross Toll Revenues or Total Revenues expected to be
generated by the Private Transportation Project. Caltrans shall, no later than sixty days
after the issuance of the Notices of Determination for the Initial Facility, recommend to the
Commission that the Commission amend the STIP to reallocate the public funds presently
budgeted in the 1990 STIP for median improvements to the State Transportation Facility to
other State transportation projects outside the Absolute Protection Zone.
(e) Caltrans covenants that, to the greatest extent possible giving due consideration to the
safety of the traveling public, it shall not undertake any action or activity (including, but not
limited to that relating to design, construction, maintenance, or traffic management on the
Combined Transportation Facility or elsewhere) in any manner which might reasonably be
anticipated to interfere materially with CPTC's ability to design, construct, modify, maintain
and operate the Private Transportation Project as contemplated herein or which might
reasonably be anticipated to affect adversely the volume or the flow of traffic to or from the
Private Transportation Project or the Gross Toll Revenues or Total Revenues expected to
be generated thereby, and together with its Authorized Caltrans Representative, it shall in
good faith cooperate with CPTC and the Authorized CPTC Representative in coordinating
all Caltrans actions or activities which could potentially result in such interference or such
adverse effect or which present opportunities for maximizing the benefits flowing to or
from the Private Transportation Project.
(f) Caltrans shall provide to CPTC a reasonable advance opportunity to review preliminary and
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Subsections (a), (b), (c), (d) or (e) of this Section 3.2 and shall not approve any such
facility or project without considering the views of CPTC with respect thereto. Caltrans'
obligations under this Subsection (f) shall not limit its other obligations hereunder.
(g) Caltrans hereby grants CPTC a right of first offer and first refusal during the term of this
Agreement with respect to the development and operation of any airspace improvement,
over, under, on or within the State Transportation Facility right-of-way (each, a "Proposed
Project"), subject to approval of the Commission. CPTC's rights under this Subsection (g)
shall be implemented as follows:
(i) If at any time during the term of this Agreement Caltrans formulates a proposal for,
or receives an unsolicited third-party proposal or intends to solicit third-party
proposals for, any Proposed Project (other than for construction contracts required
under Caltrans' construction procurement procedures to be let on a competitive bid),
Caltrans shall, prior to negotiating with any third party in connection with such
proposal, or prior to soliciting such proposals from any third party, as the case may
be, furnish notice to CPTC setting forth the terms of such proposal or contemplated
request for proposals, as the case may be, and afford CPTC a period of not less than
ninety days within which to submit (A) CPTC's plan for accomplishing the specified
development, design, construction, installation, implementation, ownership or
operation of the Proposed Project in accordance with Caltrans' proposal; or (B)
CPTC's proposal of terms for accomplishing the development, design, construction,
furnishing, installation, ownership or operation of the Proposed Project in
accordance with Caltrans' contemplated solicitation of proposals, as the case may be.
IfCPTC responds with an implementation plan or a proposal, as the case may be,
within the aforesaid ninety-day period, Caltrans shall commence and continue for z
reasonable period of time (but not less than an additional ninety days) reasonable
good faith negotiations with CPTC in an effort to finalize a mutually acceptable
contract governing CPTC's participation in the Proposed Project. Caltrans agrees
that it shall not conduct any negotiations with any third party in connection with the
Proposed Project in question until the earlier of (I) the expiration of the initial
ninety-day period without receipt of a plan or proposal, as the case may be, from
CPTC; (II) indication by CPTC that it does not wish to pursue participation in such
Proposed Project; or (III) the expiration of a reasonable period of time (as described
above) during which time reasonable good faith negotiations between Caltrans and
CPTC fail to produce a mutually acceptable contract; and
(ii) If CPTC agrees to mutually acceptable contractual terms in accordance with
Subsection (i) above and fails to execute the agreement within the period specified
above, CPTC's rights hereunder shall terminate and Caltrans shall have no further
obligation to offer such contract to CPTC and shall be free to enter into sad:
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Costs incurred by CPTC in preparing any airspace proposal shall not be treated as Capital
Costs under this Agreement.
3.3. Franchise Fees.
CPTC shall pay Caltrans throughout the term of this Agreement a monthly Base Franchise Fee of
$10, payable at least annually in advance commencing January 1, 1991. CPTC shall also pay
Caltrans, if applicable, the Variable Franchise Fee and the Excess Franchise Fee as provided in
Sections 9.4 and 9.5 hereof, respectively. In the event CPTC is ever thirty days or more
delinquent in the payment of any Franchise Fee, Caltrans shall promptly notify CPTC in writing of
such delinquency, and CPTC shall have a grace period of thirty days from receipt of such notice
to pay such Franchise Fee together with interest thereon from the date such amount was due
calculated at the Base Return Rate.
3.4. Lease and Extension Options
(a) To facilitate the development, construction and operation of the Private Transportation
Project as authorized by the Enabling Act and in consideration of:
(i) Caltrans' reversionary interest in the Private Transportation Project;
(ii) Caltrans' rights hereunder to the Variable Franchise Fee and the Excess Franchise
Fee;
(iii) CPTC's agreement to bear during the Operating Lease Term the administrative
costs, police service costs, maintenance costs and other Operating Costs associated
with the operation of the Private Transportation Project; and
(iv) Rent in the amount of $1 per year throughout each Construction Lease Term and the
Operating Lease Term, provided that CPTC shall be required to prepay the rent for
the full term of any Lease upon its execution;
Caltrans hereby:
(v) Covenants and agrees to lease exclusively and irrevocably (subject to the express
termination rights under Section 3.5 hereof) to CPTC, but only after the Notices of
Determination have been filed as required by Section 3.1 hereof to evidence
environmental clearance, by execution of a Lease for recordation in the county or
counties in which the Initial Facility shall be located, all of its right, title and interest
in and to the Real Property for the Initial Facility, together with all improvements
thereon (including, but not limited to, the Initial Facility) for the Construction Lease
Term and the Operating Lease Term. From and after the date of this Agreement,
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interest in the Real Property for the Initial Facility so as to inhibit its ability to lease
the Real Property for the Initial Facility to CPTC as aforesaid.
(vi) Grants to CPTC, unconditional options to lease under an exclusive and irrevocable
(subject to the express termination rights under Section 3.5 hereof and the provisions
of Subsection (vii) below) Lease, the Real Property for each Facility in addition to
the Initial Facility; provided, however, that no such Lease shall be executed by
Caltrans until after any Notices ofDetermination required under CEQA have been
filed to evidence environmental clearance with respect to such Facility. The term of
the options granted hereby shall expire at the expiration of this Agreement.
(vii) CPTC's options under clause (vi) above with respect to any Facility shall be
terminated if, prior to the execution of a Lease therefor under clause (vi) above, a
public entity, including Caltrans, shall achieve environmental clearance for both a
free and toll alternative (consistent with the Initial Facility) for improving all or any
portion of the Real Property not occupied by the Initial Facility, CPTC's rights under
clause (vi) with respect to such portion of the Real Property shall terminate unless
(A) CPTC elects to implement the additional Facility thereon and exercises its option
for a Lease of the Real Property within 180 days of the filing of the Notices of
Determination (or, if applicable, amended Notices ofDetermination) for such
publicly sponsored improvements, and (B) if requested by the public entity, CPTC
provides for reimbursement of the public entity's reasonable costs and expenses (as
mutually agreed to by CPTC and such public entity) incurred in achieving such
environmental clearance. Notwithstanding the foregoing, ifCPTC shall not satisfy
the provisions of clauses (A) and (B) and the public sponsor of the improvements
fails to commence construction of the improvements within three years after the
filing of the required Notices ofDetermination, then CPTC's rights as to such Real
Property under clause (vi) above shall be reinstated as of such three year anniversary
date.
(viii) Within forty-five days of CPTC's exercise of any option for Real Property for any
additional Facility, or such later date as may be designated by CPTC, Caltrans shall
lease exclusively and irrevocably (subject to the express termination rights under
Section 3.5 hereof) to CPTC, by execution of a Lease for recordation in the county
or counties in which such Facility shall be located, all of its right, title and interest in
and to the Real Property therefor, together with all improvements thereon
(including, but not limited to, such Facility) for the Operating Lease Term; provided,
however, that any Lease granted under the circumstances described in clause (vii)
above shall be terminable by Caltrans if CPTC shall not have achieved Construction
Commencement with respect to such Facility within eighteen months after the
execution date thereof, and any Lease granted under the circumstances described m
clause (vi) above shall be terminable by Caltrans if a public entity, including Caltrans,
demonstrates the availability of sufficient funds to construct the Facility which is the
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such Facility within 270 days of such demonstration by the public entity. From and
after the date of this Agreement, Caltrans shall not transfer, lease or otherwise
diminish or encumber its right, title or interest in the Real Property for any Facility
so as to inhibit its ability to lease such Real Property to CPTC as aforesaid.
(b) Following the execution of this Agreement, and within forty-five days of CPTC's
commencement of its efforts to achieve environmental clearance on any additional Facility,
or such later date as may be acceptable to CPTC, CPTC shall, on behalf of Caltrans but at
CPTC's expense, obtain a title policy report. Concurrently with the execution of the Lease
for the Initial Facility or any additional Facility, or such later date as may be acceptable to
CPTC, (i) CPTC shall, on behalf of Caltrans but at CPTC's expense, obtain a policy of title
insurance insuring CPTC's interest in the Initial Facility or such additional Facility
(including all Leasehold Mortgages in respect thereof) or (ii) Caltrans shall provide, at
CPTC's expense, reasonable assurance of title acceptable to CPTC, in its sole discretion, in
each case, showing or assuring that Caltrans has Title to such Real Property free of all
third-party interests therein sufficient to permit the construction and installation of such
Facility thereon and to permit operation of the Facility by CPTC as a private toll facility as
contemplated herein and in the Lease therefor, without any reimbursement or compensation
obligation on the part ofCPTC other than the rent payable under such Lease. Upon the
closing of any financing of the Initial Facility or any additional Facility, (i) CPTC shall, on
behalf of Caltrans but at CPTC's expense, obtain endorsements to the policy of title
insurance acceptable to CPTC's Lenders and Leasehold Mortgagees or a mortgagee's
policy of title insurance in the amount of the loans and leasehold mortgages for such
Facility, or (ii) Caltrans shall provide at CPTC's expense, such other reasonable assurances
of title acceptable to CPTC's Lenders and Leasehold Mortgagees, in their sole discretion.
(c) If it is discovered that there is an encumbrance, residual interest, lien or other defect, or any
failure of the Real Property to comply with applicable Laws and Regulations, any of which
impairs Caltrans' Title to the Real Property or CPTC's rights to study, design, finance,
construct, operate and maintain the Private Transportation Project as contemplated by this
Agreement, then Caltrans shall, at CPTC's request but at Caltrans' expense, promptly
remove any such exceptions or exclusions set forth in a title report or title insurance policy
delivered pursuant to Subsection (b) above or remedy such other impairment or otherwise
achieve compliance with applicable Laws and Regulations as required under this Subsection
(c). In no event shall any action taken by either CPTC or Caltrans under either this
Subsection (c) or Subsection (b) above constitute Caltrans' approval of any Facility under
CEQA.
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3.5. Term of Agreement
(a) This Agreement shall expire on that date on which the Lease with respect to the Initial
Facility expires or is otherwise terminated.
(b) This Agreement may be terminated prior to its expiration upon the occurrence of any of the
following:
(i) CPTC in its sole and absolute discretion determines prior to Construction
Commencement of the Initial Facility that the Private Transportation Project or the
Initial Facility is not feasible, for economic or any other reasons, or that pending or
threatened litigation arising directly or indirectly from the Private Transportation
Project, or any Facility, is likely to have a material adverse effect on the
development, construction or operation of the Private Transportation Project as
herein contemplated, CPTC's role with respect thereto, or any material provision of
this Agreement, the Lease or any other Project Agreement, and CPTC elects, and
promptly notifies Caltrans in writing of such election, to terminate this Agreement.
CPTC's exercise of its rights under this clause shall relieve CPTC and the CPTC
Parties of any and all further liability or obligation to Caltrans;
(ii) After the payment in full of all debt financing for the Private Transportation Project
(or any Facility) CPTC, in its sole and absolute discretion, determines that its
continued operation of the Private Transportation Project, or any Facility, as
contemplated hereunder is no longer feasible, for economic or other reasons,
including, but not limited to, CPTC's having earned the full Reasonable Return on
Investment, or that an event ofForce Majeure, a Change in Law, or pending or
threatened litigation arising directly or indirectly from the Private Transportation
Project (or such Facility) is likely to have a material adverse effect on CPTC's
operation of the Private Transportation Project (or such Facility) as herein
contemplated, CPTC's role with respect hereto, or any material provision of this
Agreement, the Lease or any other Project Agreements, and CPTC elects, and
promptly notifies Caltrans in writing of such election, to terminate this Agreement,
the Lease and the Project Agreements. CPTC's exercise of its rights under this
clause shall relieve CPTC and the CPTC Parties of any and all further liability or
obligation to Caltrans; provided, however, that CPTC's exercise of its right of
termination hereunder shall in no way compromise or diminish any claim for an
Event ofLoss or Event ofDefault which may have occurred on or prior to such date
of termination;
(iii) A Notice of Determination shall not have been filed for the Initial Facility pursuant
to CEQA by December 3 1, 1993, and Caltrans elects, and gives Preliminary
Termination Notice to CPTC and Leasehold Mortgagee of its election, to terminate
this Agreement and (A) CPTC shall fail to cure such matter within forty-five days
after receipt of such Preliminary Termination Notice, and (B) Caltrans gives Final
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Termination Notice to CPTC and Leasehold Mortgagee of its intent to declare this
Agreement terminated, and (C) Leasehold Mortgagee or the Substituted Entity shall
fail to cure such matter as permitted by Section 16.2 hereof; provided, however, that
if Caltrans' failure to comply with any of its obligations under the Project
Agreements to which it is a party shall have contributed materially to CPTC's failure
to meet the aforementioned milestone date or the cure of such matter as aforesaid,
then such milestone date or cure period shall be equitably extended beyond such date
when Caltrans has cured its default; provided, further, that CPTC, Leasehold
Mortgagee or the Substituted Entity must promptly following such Caltrans cure
commence efforts to obtain the Notice ofDetermination and prosecute such efforts
to completion with reasonable diligence;
(iv) Construction Commencement shall not have occurred by December 3 1, 1994,
subject to any extension for Force Majeure, and Caltrans elects, and gives
Preliminary Termination Notice to CPTC and Leasehold Mortgagee of its election,
to terminate this Agreement and (A) CPTC shall fail to cure such matter within
forty-five days after receipt of such Preliminary Termination Notice, and (B)
Caltrans gives Final Termination Notice to CPTC and Leasehold Mortgagee of its
intent to declare this Agreement terminated, and (C) Leasehold Mortgagee or the
Substituted Entity shall fail to cure such matter as permitted by Section 16.2 hereof;
provided, however, that if Caltrans' failure to comply with any of its obligations
under the Project Agreements to which it is a party shall have contributed materially
to CPTC's failure to meet the aforementioned milestone date or the cure of such
matter as aforesaid, then such milestone date or cure period shall be equitably
extended beyond such date once Caltrans has cured its default; provided, further,
that CPTC, Leasehold Mortgagee or the Substituted Entity must promptly following
such Caltrans cure commence efforts to achieve Construction Commencement and
prosecute such efforts to completion with reasonable diligence;
(v) Caltrans determines, and gives Preliminary Termination Notice to CPTC and
Leasehold Mortgagee of such determination, that CPTC has actually or
constructively abandoned or canceled the Private Transportation Project by
discontinuing without excuse the operation thereof as contemplated in this
Agreement for a period of thirty consecutive days, and (A) CPTC shall fail, for a
period of twenty consecutive days following receipt of such Preliminary Termination
Notice to provide Caltrans with a suitable explanation for such discontinuation or to
resume operations, and (B) Caltrans determines that no suitable explanation for such
discontinuation has been given and that operations have not been resumed and
thereafter declares a CPTC Default and pursues the course of action described in
Section 14.1 hereof and clause (vi) below; provided, however, that if Caltrans'
failure to comply with any of its obligations under the Project Agreements to which
it is a party shall have contributed materially to CPTC's failure to correct such
matter, then Caltrans' right to declare a CPTC Default shall be suspended for so long
as Caltrans shall remain in noncompliance under any said Project Agreement;
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(vi) After Caltrans' issuance of a Final Default Notice under Section 14. 1 hereof,
Caltrans elects under Subsection 14.2(b) to terminate this Agreement and gives Final
Termination Notice to CPTC, its Lenders and Leasehold Mortgagees of such
election to terminate and its Lenders, Leasehold Mortgagees or its Substituted Entity
shall fail to cure such matter as permitted by Section 16.2 hereof; or
(vii) CPTC's interests in the Private Transportation Project and the Project Agreements
are acquired by Caltrans.
Caltrans agrees that if at the expiration of this Agreement and the Lease CPTC shall not
have fully recovered the Reasonable Return on Investment allowable hereunder, then
Caltrans shall exercise its best efforts to seek and obtain legislative authorization to extend
and renew the term of this Agreement and the Lease for a period sufficient to enable CPTC
to recover all such unrecovered amounts ofReasonable Return on Investment.
Reports.
CPTC shall, within 120 days after the later of (i) the Acceptance Date for a Facility or (ii)
the closing of the permanent debt financing for a Facility, submit to Caltrans a statement of
the Capital Costs at Completion with respect to the Facility covered by the related Notice
of Acceptance, including the Construction Period Capital Return, which statement will be
prepared by CPTC in accordance with this Agreement and, to the extent applicable, GAAP,
and audited by a nationally recognized independent accounting firm selected by CPTC and
approved by Caltrans.
CPTC shall, within 120 days of the end of each Fiscal Year during the Operating Lease
Term, submit to Caltrans a copy of CPTC's annually audited financial statements, and
statements based on such financial statements, setting forth the following information:
(i) The amount of Total Revenues and Gross Toll Revenues received in such Fiscal
Year;
(ii) The Operating Costs expended in such Fiscal Year (including a statement of cash
benefits paid to government entities in such Fiscal Year, such as Taxes, franchise
fees and other amounts), including the federal and state taxes CPTC shall be deemed
to have paid for such Fiscal Year;
(iii) The Capital Costs expended in such Fiscal Year;
(iv) The Available Cash Flow for such Fiscal Year;
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(v) The Base Return Rate, including the amount of any incremental adjustments for
indexing and Incentive Return on Investment permitted hereunder, and the results of
the Base NPV and Total NPV calculations under Article 9 hereof;
(vi) If applicable, a demonstration of the level of increased Annual Peak Hour Vehicle
Occupant Volume under Section 9.3 hereof;
(vii) The amount of Variable Franchise Fee, if any, to be paid to Caltrans in such Fiscal
Year;
(viii) The amount ofExcess Franchise Fee, if any, to be paid to Caltrans in such Fiscal
Year; and
(ix) The size and changes in reserve accounts during such Fiscal Year.
In order to facilitate the identification of the information reported above, CPTC shall
maintain a separate self-balancing set of accounts that relate exclusively to the Private
Transportation Project. Such accounts shall include all assets, liabilities, operating
revenues, and operating expenses, and be maintained in accordance with GAAP.
(c) The statements described above shall be for the Private Transportation Project only, shall
be prepared by CPTC in accordance with this Agreement and GAAP and shall be audited
by a nationally recognized independent accounting firm selected by CPTC and approved by
Caltrans. Such statements shall include notes on reported information identifying the basis
of calculations made and the underlying assumptions, and shall include a report on CPTC's
system of internal accounting control under the applicable standards required by the
AICPA. The statements shall be submitted to Caltrans in a format substantially similar to
the format demonstrated in Exhibit J or such other format as is reasonably acceptable to
Caltrans. The final format of such statements shall be determined by CPTC, subject to
approval by Caltrans. In the preparation of the aforesaid reports, CPTC shall identify all
Capital Costs, Operating Costs and all transactions with Related Parties or Constituent
Members which, in the reasonable good faith judgment of CPTC, do not meet any of the
following criteria:
(i) Are expressly permitted by this Agreement;
(ii) Are less than 1 10% of the amounts which Caltrans would have likely paid for
comparable goods or services;
(iii) Are consistent with generally available commercial list prices;
(iv) Are justifiable by life cycle analysis, accelerated delivery or completion of goods or
services;
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(v) Are consistent with industry practices; or
(vi) (A) Are on terms (including but not limited to price) more favorable to CPTC than
those available in the normal course of business with parties which are not Related
Parties or Constituent Members or (B) have been negotiated by CPTC and the party
providing the goods or services on an arm's length basis.
(d) In addition to the auditor's report required above, the independent auditor shall submit to
Caltrans reports on: (i) CPTC's system of internal accounting controls under the applicable
standards required by the AICPA; and (ii) CPTC's compliance with the terms of Section
13.2(h) hereof.
(e) Caltrans may, at its own expense, conduct an audit verifying that the audits required in this
Section 3.6 were conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. If
Caltrans determines, on the basis of such audit, that the independent auditor's audit
described above was not conducted in accordance with such standards, then Caltrans shall
notify CPTC of the scope of any additional audits which Caltrans requires to be performed,
and such additional audits shall be performed at CPTC's expense by a new independent
auditor selected by CPTC and approved by Caltrans. CPTC will cause the new audit to be
completed within 120 days of Caltrans' approval of the new auditor.
3.7. Opinion of Caltrans Chief Counsel.
Caltrans shall furnish concurrently with the execution of this Agreement and the Lease, and when
requested by CPTC in the course of obtaining debt or equity financing for the Private
Transportation Project, an opinion of Caltrans' Chief Counsel substantially in the form attached
hereto as Exhibit E.
3.8. CPTC Property.
The parties agree that CPTC's property, franchise and other contract rights created or recognized
by this Agreement, the Lease and the other Project Agreements to use and enjoy the Real
Property and the Private Transportation Project in the manner, to the extent and for the purposes
authorized and contemplated by the Project Agreements, constitute valuable property ofCPTC
(collectively, "CPTC Property").
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Article 4.
Private Transportation Project Implementation
4.1. Design.
(a) CPTC's Rights and Responsibilities. CPTC shall be responsible for designing each
Facility undertaken hereunder, which may be accomplished based on a Design-Build
method of project implementation. All such design shall be in accordance with the
applicable Design Standards referenced and set forth in Exhibit C hereto as in effect as of
December 31, 1990 or, as to any Facilities subsequent to the Initial Facility, as of the date
of exercise ofthe option for the Real Property therefor. CPTC and its architects, engineers
and contractors shall assume all professional responsibility for the accuracy and
completeness of all data and material provided to Caltrans.
(b) Caltrans* Rights and Responsibilities. Caltrans shall have the right to review and to
approve CPTC's design prior to commencement of construction of any Facility; provided,
however, that such approval shall be limited to validating that the design is in accordance
with the Design Standards as required under Subsection (a) above. Caltrans agrees to
provide copies of its approvals to CPTC's Lenders and Leasehold Mortgagees upon
CPTC's request. As requested by CPTC, Caltrans shall make personnel available (at
CPTC's design location if requested by CPTC) for Oversight Services during all phases of
design, preparation ofPlans and Specifications and preparation of estimates. In the event
that CPTC does not request concurrent Caltrans review at CPTC's design locations,
Caltrans will comment and provide documented objections or approvals within twenty-one
days of receipt of documents, plans and drawings as provided in Section 18.1 hereof,
provided, however, complicated plans and large amounts of plans will allow the time to be
extended by mutual agreements. Caltrans shall, upon CPTC's request and at CPTC's cost
and expense, undertake detailed review or checking of the design, related details or the
accuracy with which such designs are depicted on CPTC's proposed Plans and
Specifications but otherwise shall not be required to undertake such level of review.
(c) Critical Safety Compliance Orders. The Authorized Caltrans Representative may issue
during the design of any Facility, and CPTC shall comply with, Critical Safety Compliance
Orders, provided that the modifications required thereby are to the same extent being
imposed on State-funded transportation facilities of substantially equivalent character at the
same stage of development as the Facility affected by such Critical Safety Compliance
Orders; provided, however, that for purposes of meeting any milestone dates imposed by
Section 3.5 hereof, such Critical Safety Compliance Orders may, at CPTC's election, be
deemed an event ofForce Majeure to which the provisions of Section 11.1 hereof shall
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Compliance Order may, as appropriate, be treated by CPTC as Capital Costs or Operating
Costs; provided, however, that any amounts ofVariable Franchise Fee applied to defray
such costs as permitted by Section 9.5 hereof shall not be treated as either Capital Costs or
Operating Costs.
Environmental.
CPTC's Rights and Responsibilities. CPTC shall use best efforts to obtain all
environmental clearances required by State and federal law for each Facility undertaken
hereunder. CPTC will prepare all documentation for environmental clearance and any
environmental analysis required for permits and approvals necessary to the construction and
operation of the Private Transportation Project, or Facilities, as contemplated by this
Agreement. Data, material and documents will be reviewed for conformity with CEQA,
and, if necessary, NEPA requirements.
Cal trans' Rights and Responsibilities. If requested by CPTC, Caltrans will provide
Technical Services in connection with CEQA and, if necessary, NEPA. In addition to such
Technical Services, CPTC may request additional technical assistance and concurrent
review by Caltrans personnel assigned to support CPTC's proposal processes and
documentation in the development of an acceptable environmental document.
Approval. CPTC and Caltrans both recognize and concur that final approval of any
Facility by Caltrans is expressly contingent upon completion of environmental review under
CEQA. CPTC shall have no right hereunder to commence construction of any Facility,
until Caltrans has fulfilled its obligations under CEQA related to such Facility and any
required Notices ofDetermination have been filed.
No-build Alternative. It is understood by both parties that a "no-build" alternative may be
the final alternative selected.
Evidence of Approval. Completion of the environmental review process with respect to
each Facility, as evidenced by the filing of any Notices ofDetermination required under
CEQA, shall constitute evidence of the required approval to proceed with implementation
of such Facility pursuant to the terms of this Agreement, including any such modifications
thereto as shall have been necessary in order to obtain such approval.
Permits and Agreements.
CPTC's Rights and Responsibilities. CPTC shall use best efforts to obtain all permits
and licenses, pay all charges and fees, and give all notices necessary and incident to the
prosecution of the work entailed by the implementation of each Facility undertaken.
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(b) Caltrans' Rights and Responsibilities. Subject to reasonable restrictions and conditions
regarding the safety and operation of the State Transportation Facility and the safety of the
traveling public as established by Caltrans, Caltrans shall, immediately upon CPTC's
request, grant such encroachment permits as may be reasonably necessary for the expedient
prosecution of CPTC's activities hereunder (including but not limited to such encroachment
permits, containing standard conditions and provisions, as may be reasonably necessary to
permit CPTC, its employees and its contractors to operate and maintain the Private
Transportation Project, irrespective of whether Caltrans is providing any such service to
CPTC). Caltrans will provide timely assistance to CPTC with respect to CPTC's permit
processes and negotiations for agreements with local governmental entities in the
development of the Private Transportation Project. Caltrans will, upon request, assist
CPTC in preparing and presenting materials required to obtain any permits, approvals or
zoning relief required to design, construct, acquire, install and/or operate the Private
Transportation Project or any Facility. Caltrans shall be reimbursed for reasonable costs
incurred as a result of its efforts expended on behalf of and at the request of CPTC.
4.4 Construction.
(a) CPTC's Rights and Responsibilities. CPTC shall be responsible for constructing (using
its own forces or contracted forces of a prime contractor properly licensed in the State) and
obtaining all necessary permits and approvals for each Facility undertaken. CPTC may
implement phased or staged development and construction in accordance with the Design-
Build method of project implementation. Once construction has commenced, CPTC shall
use due diligence to complete such Facility.
(b) Caltrans' Rights and Responsibilities. Caltrans will provide Oversight Services in the
form of on-site personnel as provided in Section 4.5(b) hereof.
(c) Standards. Construction of each Facility, whether undertaken by CPTC, its contractors or
any subcontractor, shall be in accordance with the applicable Construction Standards and
applicable Standard Specifications referenced and set forth in Exhibit D hereto as in effect
as ofDecember 31, 1990 or, as to any Facilities subsequent to the Initial Facility, as of the
date of exercise of the option for the Real Property therefor, exclusive of any provisions
relating to Caltrans' procurement procedures and standards.
(d) Payment and Performance Bonds. CPTC shall, for the construction of each Facility,
furnish or cause to be furnished payment and performance bonds or completion guarantees
acceptable to CPTC's construction financing Lender, but in no event shall the same be less
than the amounts required under California Civil Code Section 3248. Such bonds or
guarantees shall be issued by a surety licensed to do business in California and shall provide
that all alterations, extensions of time, additional work and other changes authorized by this
Agreement or Critical Safety Compliance Orders may be made without further consent by
the surety or sureties providing the bonds or the guarantees. Copies of the bonds or
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guarantees shall be furnished to Caltrans not later than Construction Commencement with
respect to any Facility.
(e) Critical Safety Compliance Orders. The Authorized Caltrans Representative may issue
during the construction phase for any Facility, and CPTC shall comply with, Critical Safety
Compliance Orders provided that the modifications required thereby are to the same extent
being imposed on State-funded transportation facilities of substantially equivalent size and
character at the same stage of development as the Facility affected by such Critical Safety
Compliance Orders; provided, however, that for purposes of meeting any milestone dates
specified in Section 3.5 hereof, such Critical Safety Compliance Orders may, at CPTC's
option, be deemed an event ofForce Majeure to which the provisions of Section 11.1
hereof shall apply.
Personnel and Administration.
CPTC's Rights and Responsibilities. CPTC shall designate an Authorized CPTC
Representative (and an alternate) to represent CPTC at all times through the course of
development, property acquisition, design, construction and operation of the Private
Transportation Project. CPTC shall have exclusive control over the assignment and
replacement of its personnel, contractors and subcontractors on the Private Transportation
Project.
Caltrans' Rights and Responsibilities. Caltrans shall designate a primary Authorized
Caltrans Representative charged with the full responsibilities of Caltrans hereunder in
connection with the implementation of each Facility undertaken hereunder, including, but
not limited to, overseeing CPTC's compliance with the applicable Construction Standards
as described in Exhibit D and coordinating Oversight Services with CPTC's project
implementation schedule. Caltrans may in its reasonable discretion replace its personnel
dedicated to the Private Transportation Project or any Facility; provided, however, that
Caltrans shall not arbitrarily or without good cause (e.g., for reasons of the employee's
request, criminal activity or inadequate performance) remove, replace or reassign the
primary Authorized Caltrans Representative referenced above unless CPTC consents
thereto; provided further, that upon CPTC's reasonable request, Caltrans shall for cause
remove and replace such primary Authorized Caltrans Representative with a substitute
reasonably acceptable to CPTC.
Co-located Personnel. To the extent requested by CPTC and permitted under existing
Caltrans policies and procedures and the Laws and Regulations all existing at the time of
the request, Caltrans will co-locate its Oversight Services personnel with CPTC's personnel
at the California sites of CPTC's work production in order to assist in expediting
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(d) Files. CPTC shall maintain at its address specified in Section 18. 18 hereof a set of project
files indexed in accordance with Caltrans' Project Development Uniform File System.
4.6. Public Safety.
In the performance of the activities authorized under this Article, CPTC agrees to furnish, direct
and maintain, or cause to be furnished, directed and maintained, such fences, temporary railing,
barricades, lights, signs and other devices and take such other protective measures as are required
by applicable Caltrans standards.
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Article 6. Operations and Maintenance
1. Operations.
) Traffic Operations Plan. Prior to the execution of a Lease with respect to a Facility,
CPTC shall submit to Caltrans for its approval a Traffic Operations Plan (the "Traffic
Operations Plan"), which approval will not be unreasonably withheld. The Traffic
Operations Plan is intended solely to assure that the Private Transportation Project is
operated in a safe and efficient manner consistent with the adjacent public transportation
facilities and shall not in any way infringe upon CPTC's rights as set forth in Section 6.1(b)
hereof. CPTC shall submit any revision or amendment to the Traffic Operations Plan to
Caltrans for its review and approval, which approval will be granted unless Caltrans
presents a competent engineering analysis showing that the proposed change would
measurably reduce the safety of the traveling public on the Combined Transportation
Facility and connecting State transportation facilities. Any dispute arising under this
Section 6. 1(a) shall be subject to the provisions of Article 15 hereof.
The Traffic Operations Plan shall include an operational traffic analysis of the Private
Transportation Project and its interface with the connecting and adjacent public facilities.
The following information and relevant underlying assumptions shall be provided for the
peak a.m. and p.m. periods and other timeframes in which the operation of the Private
Transportation Project changes from that in effect during the peak period operation and for
operating scenarios otherthan the initial operating scenario:
Existing and projected volumes;
Ingress and egress locations;
Types of vehicles allowed or excluded from the Private Transportation Project;
Weaving lengths under anticipated traffic flow patterns;
Connections at each end of the Private Transportation Project;
Enforcement areas and procedures; and
Delays and queues.
(b) CPTC's Rights and Responsibilities. From and after the Acceptance Date as to any
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administrative, toll collection and (except as provided in Subsection (c) below) the Traffic
Management activities associated with the operation of such Facility for use by the generaJ
public in accordance with applicable Caltrans safety standards. CPTC is expressly
authorized, subject to Caltrans' prior approval, to establish and implement additional safety
policies, including, but not limited to, rules governing the use of the Private Transportation
Project for the transportation of hazardous materials and dangerous loads and the issuance
of transportation permits, provided that such policies shall not be less stringent than those
established by Caltrans for the State Transportation Facility. Operations of the Private
Transportation Project may be interrupted as CPTC may determine to be necessary or
advisable for reasons of, among other things, construction, modification, security, and
public safety but only in such manner as is not inconsistent with the Traffic Operations
Plan. Caltrans retains the right to enter the Private Transportation Project to keep it open if
it is closed by CPTC in a manner inconsistent with this Agreement or the Traffic Operations
Plan.
CPTC or its operations contractor will use its best efforts to manage all operational
surveillance equipment, driver information signs (including changeable message signs), toll
collection equipment and related components of the Private Transportation Project so as to
optimize traffic operations within the Private Transportation Project and the Total
Revenues and Gross Toll Revenues derived therefrom. CPTC is expressly authorized to
erect and maintain, in accordance with applicable published Caltrans standards, such
informational signs and other traffic control devices as may be necessary and convenient to
implement its rights and obligations hereunder. CPTC shall be free to install and use video,
photographic and other forms of surveillance equipment for traffic management, toll
enforcement and related purposes. Said signs and equipment shall be subject to the
restrictions contained in any applicable encroachment permits issued by Caltrans under
Section 4.3(b) hereof.
CPTC shall keep the Private Transportation Project open 24 hours per day, every day,
except where reasonably required for maintenance or emergencies, or unless the Traffic
Operations Plan provides, or has been amended to provide, for operation of the Private
Transportation Project for a lesser period.
(c) Caltrans Rights and Responsibilities. Caltrans shall provide Oversight Services for
Traffic Management activities on the Private Transportation Project to ensure compliance
with applicable Caltrans operational standards. CPTC may contract to engage Caltrans to
perform the Traffic Management activities on any Facility in accordance with all applicable
Caltrans standards and guidelines, which Caltrans hereby agrees to perform on mutually
agreeable reasonable terms and conditions. Caltrans further agrees that if it is engaged by
CPTC to perform such Traffic Management activities, it will use all best efforts to
coordinate such activities with CPTC's toll collection activities so as to comply with
applicable Caltrans safety standards and maximize the Total Revenues and Gross Toll
Revenues generated by the Private Transportation Project. In the event CPTC does not
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reasonable Oversight Services to monitor CPTC's compliance with applicable CaJtrans'
Traffic Management standards, whether contracted to third parties or performed by CPTC's
own forces. Speed limits and oversize, overweight and overlength restrictions set by CPTC
for the Private Transportation Project shall not exceed limits established for the State
Transportation Facility or public High Occupancy Vehicle lanes.
(d) Tolls. CPTC shall be entitled to establish, levy and collect tolls, fees and charges for the
use of the Private Transportation Project or any Facility except during any period in which
the running of the Operating Lease Term with respect thereto shall have been suspended
under Section 16 of the Lease due to an event ofForce Majeure. CPTC may in its sole
discretion, without regulation or participation of Caltrans, establish and impose, and may
subsequently modify, schedules of tolls, fees and charges for all classes and levels of use of
the Private Transportation Project, subject to the provisions of Section A.l ofExhibit A
hereto. CPTC is hereby specifically authorized to implement congestion pricing and other
variable schedules or schedules of tolls, fees and charges and other traffic management
practices so as to respond to dynamic traffic flows and maintain the highest practicable
levels of service. CPTC is expressly authorized to limit access to the Private
Transportation Project to certain categories or types of vehicles. CPTC shall be free to
adjust tolls, fees and charges and to enter into special toll arrangements with important
users of the Private Transportation Project at any time without prior notice, approval or
evaluation and is not subject to any laws or regulations relating to the control of tolls, fees,
rates, charges or prices by the Public Utilities Commission, Caltrans or any other agency,
division or subdivision of the State.
(e) AVL In addition to manual toll collection methods, CPTC is expressly authorized to
implement AVI methods for toll collection, Traffic Management, accounting and other
purposes as contemplated hereunder in accordance with applicable Caltrans standards
governing the use ofAVI technology. CPTC may require users of the Private
Transportation Project to obtain and utilize AVI equipment appropriate thereto. CPTC
shall be free to use non-AVI systems such as cellular telephones, satellites, video scanning
and other methods for vehicle identification and toll collection purposes. CPTC shall be
free to select AVI transponder distribution methods and procedures which methods may
involve wholesale and retail outlets outside the Private Transportation Project right-of-way.
Any AVI records maintained by CPTC shall be considered private and confidential business
records of a proprietary nature and shall not under any circumstance be considered public
records. Any costs and revenues related to AVI equipment not installed or operated as a
part of the Private Transportation Project, and those related to AVI component sales to
private parties, shall not be counted as Capital Costs, Operating Costs or Total
Revenues. (f) Uniforms. Any personnel collecting tolls and other charges for use of the
Private Transportation Project shall at all times be in uniform, identified as employees of
CPTC or its contractor and not as employees of Caltrans. Such uniforms shall be subject to
Caltrans' reasonable approval to assure only that any badges, lettering, color, or other
styling is sufficiently differentiated from uniforms worn by Caltrans personnel.
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(g) Shared Services. The parties hereto recognize that cost efficiencies may be achieved in
the provision of shared operations services for the Private Transportation Facility, the State
Transportation Facility and other State transportation facilities in the region, through a
sharing of operations personnel and costs (on a vehicle-miles-traveled or other equitable
basis), and the parties hereto shall use their best efforts to achieve such efficiencies.
6.2. Maintenance.
(a) CPTC's Rights and Responsibilities. Prior to commencement of operations for any
Facility, CPTC shall have submitted to Caltrans for its approval a maintenance plan for such
Facility (which, to the extent that CPTC engages Caltrans to perform maintenance services,
shall be the work plan adopted pursuant to the related Maintenance Agreement). From and
after the Acceptance Date for any Facility, CPTC shall maintain or cause to be maintained
such Facility in accordance with then applicable published Caltrans maintenance schedules
and standards. CPTC may engage Caltrans to maintain some or all of the non-toll
collection components of any Facility pursuant to a Maintenance Agreement. CPTC also
shall be entitled to perform such maintenance for its own account or engage a third party to
perform some or all of such services. For such services as to which CPTC elects not to
engage Caltrans, Caltrans shall undertake Oversight Services to monitor CPTC's
compliance with Caltrans' applicable maintenance standards, subject to reimbursement as
provided in Section 18.2 hereof. CPTC, or its contractor, shall maintain toll collection
facilities, machinery and any other toll operation equipment.
(b) Caltrans* Rights and Responsibilities. If CPTC contracts with Caltrans to provide
maintenance services as provided in Subsection (a) above, Caltrans will perform roadway,
bridge, sign, lighting, landscape, fencing and other maintenance services, as set forth in the
Maintenance Agreement. Caltrans will not maintain toll collection facilities, machinery or
any other toll operation equipment. Caltrans, when performing maintenance work for
CPTC, will conform to all Caltrans maintenance manuals, maintenance directives, policy
and procedure memorandums, and applicable Critical Safety Compliance Orders. IfCPTC
does not contract with Caltrans for such maintenance services, then Caltrans shall provide
Oversight Services for maintenance performed on the Private Transportation Project to
monitor compliance with applicable Caltrans maintenance standards.
(c) Maintenance Manuals. Caltrans shall furnish all maintenance manuals, maintenance
directives, policy and procedure memorandums, and applicable Critical Safety Compliance
Orders and all amendments or modifications thereto to CPTC on a timely basis. Receipt of
the manuals by CPTC shall constitute notice as to the contents therein. CPTC shall not be
held responsible for implementing any changes to any such Caltrans maintenance schedules
and standards expressed in such sources unless and until a manual is received or actual
reasonable notice thereof is given to CPTC.
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(d) Traffic Control. CPTC and any of its contractors, including Caltrans, performing
maintenance work within or on the Private Transportation Project right-of-way, including
ramps, feeders, interchanges or connectors into other State highways, will conform to then
applicable published Caltrans standards relative to signing, cone and barricade placement,
equipment requirements, traffic control methodology, traffic management plans, and safety
standards.
(e) Service Interruption. If maintenance, repair or alteration work necessitates significant
interruption or restriction of the flow of traffic on the Private Transportation Project, the
maintenance service provider (whether such shall be Caltrans, CPTC or a third party) shall
give at least thirty days advance written notice thereof to Caltrans and CPTC, except in
case of emergency. The maintenance service provider shall perform such activities so as to
minimize the adverse consequences to users of the Private Transportation Project, including
minimizing the interruption or restriction of traffic flow thereon, while complying with
Caltrans' applicable safety standards.




9.1. Reasonable Return on Investment
As compensation for designing, financing, constructing and operating the Private Transportation
Project, CPTC shall be entitled to a Reasonable Return on Investment, which shall be comprised
of the Base Return on Investment, and, upon demonstration of improved performance measured
by increased Annual Peak Hour Vehicle Occupant Volume, the Incentive Return on Investment,
which returns on investment shall be calculated as provided in this Article 9.
9.2 Base Return on Investment
(a) The Base Return Rate shall be seventeen percent, subject to adjustments as provided herein
(as adjusted, the "Base Return Rate").
(b) At the end of each Fiscal Year during the Operating Term, CPTC shall derive the net
present value of the Base Return on Investment (the "Base NPV") by subtracting:
(i) The Capital Costs at Completion, from
(ii) The sum of present values, as of the Acceptance Date of the Initial Facility, of each
prior Fiscal Year's Available Cash Flow retained by CPTC as Base Return on
Investment, discounted at the Base Return Rate for that Fiscal Year as though
Available Cash Flow in each Fiscal Year were retained at the end of such Fiscal
Year.
The parties hereto acknowledge and agree that the Base Return Rate is based upon an assumption
that the capital structure contemplated in CPTC's Original Pro Forma shall not have to be
adjusted prior to the Acceptance Date. If, however, it shall be necessary to adjust such capital
structure prior to the Acceptance Date in response to changing financial markets, a change in the
capital structure contemplated in CPTC's Original Pro Forma, or other circumstances, CPTC may
at its option petition Caltrans for an adjustment in the Base Return Rate to reflect the impact of
such changed conditions. If so petitioned, Caltrans may grant CPTC an equitable increase in the
Base Return Rate.
9.3. Incentive Return on Investment
(a) It is Caltrans' objective to encourage CPTC to establish, implement, maintain and refine
such toll structures, traffic operations procedures and other measures as may be within
CPTC's control so as to maximize the number of vehicle occupants traveling on all or part
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of the Combined Transportation Facility during peak demand periods while maintaining
applicable safety standards. To such end, CPTC shall have the right, but not the obligation,
to modify and improve, subject to compliance with applicable environmental and permitting
requirements and subject to Caltrans approval as provided under Section 5.1 hereof, the
Private Transportation Project so as to encourage and accommodate higher Annual Peak
Hour Vehicle Occupant Volumes. Such measures may include, but shall not be limited to,
the financing, design, construction and operation of "park and ride" lots, bus systems and
other mass transit services, provided that such measures shall be in accordance with
applicable Caltrans standards. At CPTC's option, such modifications and improvements
shall be accepted by Caltrans as part of the Private Transportation Project and the costs
associated therewith shall be treated as Operating Costs or Capital Costs, as appropriate,
under this Agreement.
(b) CPTC shall for any Fiscal Year be entitled to adjust the Base Return Rate by incentive
increments calculated in accordance with Subsection (d) below upon a demonstration in
accordance with Subsection (c) below of increased Annual Peak Hour Vehicle Occupant
Volume on the Combined Transportation Facility during such Fiscal Year as measured
against the Base Peak Hour Vehicle Occupant Volume.
'c) To demonstrate increased Annual Peak Hour Vehicle Occupant Volume for purposes of
Subsection (b) above, CPTC shall, at its own cost and expense:
(i) Record vehicle counts on the Combined Transportation Facility at the Vehicle Count
Location using automatic vehicle detection equipment;
(ii) Determine the Peak Hour Vehicle Count;
(iii) Obtain an Estimate of Average Vehicle Occupants for such Fiscal Year;
(iv) Determine the Annual Peak Hour Vehicle Occupant Volume for such Fiscal Year;
and
(v) Determine the percentage change in the Annual Peak Hour Vehicle Occupant
Volume under clause (iv) above over the Base Peak Hour Vehicle Occupant
Volume.
d) If the percentage number determined under clause (c)(v) above is positive, CPTC shall be
entitled to the Incentive Return on Investment, calculated by adjusting the Base Return
Rate for that Fiscal Year upward by increments of twenty basis points (0.20%) for each one
percent increase in Annual Peak Hour Vehicle Occupant Volume; provided, however, that
the total of such incremental increases shall not exceed six hundred basis points (6.0%) in
any Fiscal Year (such adjusted rate shall hereinafter be referred to as the "Incentive Return
Rate").
7Jun93 1409 FA30617B.DOC R ? ~

Amended and Restated Development Franchise Agreement State Route
9. Finance Median Improveme
(e) At the end of each Fiscal Year, CPTC shall derive the net present value of the Reasonabh
Return on Investment (the "Total NPV") by subtracting:
(i) The Capital Costs at Completion, from
(ii) The sum of the present values, as of the Acceptance Date of the Initial Facility, of
the amount of each prior Fiscal Year's Available Cash Flow retained by CPTC as
Reasonable Return on Investment under Section 9.5 hereof, discounted at the
Incentive Return Rate for such Fiscal Year determined under Subsection (d) above
as though Available Cash Flow in each Fiscal Year were retained at the end of such
Fiscal Year.
9.4. Excess Franchise Fee.
After all Reasonable Return on Investment has been recovered as described above, all remaining
Available Cash Flow for any Fiscal Year shall be considered "excess toll revenues" under the
Enabling Act and shall be paid as Excess Franchise Fee to the State Highway Account.
9.5. Retention of Return; Payment of Variable and Excess Franchise Fee.
(a) CPTC shall be entitled to retain as Base Return on Investment all Available Cash Flow in
any Fiscal Year (or portion thereof) unless and until the Base NPV is zero (0) or greater.
Whenever such Base NPV is zero (0) or greater, and for so long as the Base NPV remains
zero (0) or greater, the provisions of Subsection (b) below shall govern CPTC's right to
further retain Available Cash Flow.
(b) Whenever the Base NPV is zero (0) or greater, the Available Cash Flow shall be available
for payment of the Incentive Return on Investment, the Variable Franchise Fee and/or the
Excess Franchise Fee as follows:
(i) CPTC shall be entitled to retain as Incentive Return on Investment 50% of the
Available Cash Flow in any Fiscal Year (or portion thereof) whenever the Total
NPV is less than zero (0), and the remaining 50% of the Available Cash Flow in such
Fiscal Year shall be paid to Caltrans as the Variable Franchise Fee.
(ii) Whenever the Total NPV is zero (0) or greater, all of the Available Cash Flow shall
be paid as Excess Franchise Fee to the State Highway Account. The Excess
Franchise Fee, if payable, shall be due upon delivery of the report required to be
submitted to Caltrans under Section 3.6 hereof.
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96. Taxes.
CPTC shall be solely responsible, as part of its Capital Costs and Operating Costs, for the
payment of all Taxes provided, however, that to the extent that Taxes are imposed:
(a) In respect of any of the Franchise Fees;
(b) Upon the transfer of CPTC-owned interests in real property pursuant to Section 8.2(a)
hereof; or
(c) Upon CPTC's surrender of the improvements on the Real Property at the expiration or
earlier termination of the Lease as provided in Section 8.2(b) hereof,
the Franchise Fees payable to Caltrans hereunder shall be reduced by the amount of such Taxes
deemed to have been paid in connection therewith, as set forth in the definition of "Operating
Costs." Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Real Property and the Private Transportation Project
shall at all times be considered property owned by Caltrans.
9.7. Reserve Funds.
Solely for the purposes of making the calculations required under this Article 9, including the
calculation of Capital Costs, Operating Costs and Available Cash Flow, CPTC's reserve funds
shall be limited to the following funds and amounts, irrespective ofwhether the same shall be
capitalized or expensed:
(a) A working capital reserve fund, the amount in which shall be limited to 180 days' projected
Operating Costs;
(b) A major maintenance reserve fund, the amount in which shall not be limited but annual
contributions thereto shall be limited to one percent of the Capital Costs at Completion
increased each Fiscal Year by multiplying such Capital Costs at Completion TIMES a
fraction the numerator of which shall be CPI as of the date of such adjustment and the
denominator of which shall be CPI as of the Acceptance Date;
(c) A capital improvements reserve fund, the amount in which shall be limited to fourteen
percent of the Capital Costs at Completion, increased each Fiscal Year by multiplying such
Capital Costs at Completion TIMES a fraction the numerator of which shall be CPI as of
the date of such adjustment and the denominator of which shall be CPI as of the
Acceptance Date;
(d) A debt service reserve fund, the amount in which shall be no more than the maximum debt
service for any consecutive eighteen-month period, provided that the amount in such
reserve may be increased to the maximum debt service for any consecutive twenty-four-
month period if required by Lender, and provided further that the amount in such reserve
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may be increased to the maximum debt service for any consecutive thirty-six month period
as may be required by CPTC's Lender on account of CPTC's commitments regarding High
Occupancy Vehicle operations contained in Exhibit A hereto; and
(e) Without duplication and with the approval of Caltrans, which will not be unreasonably
withheld, any other reserve fund established by CPTC's Lenders, or any other amounts,
which under the terms of CPTC's agreements with such Lenders, cannot be distributed to
CPTC or its Constituent Members.
At the expiration or earlier termination of the Operating Lease Term, the amounts remaining in
any reserves so established, including all retained interest therein, after application of any such
reserves to payment of reserved but unpaid Operating Costs and Reasonable Return on
Investment, shall be paid to the State Highway Account.
9.8. Priority of Payments.
In the event that Total Revenues are insufficient to pay all Operating Costs, CPTC shall first pay
police and maintenance service costs. Any remaining revenues may be applied by CPTC at its
sole discretion for the then applicable Fiscal Year.
9.9. Finance Obligations.
(a) CPTC's Obligations. CPTC shall be responsible for obtaining any financing for the
construction and operation of the Private Transportation Project.
(b) Caltrans' Obligations. Caltrans shall have no responsibility to meet debt service obligations
on any debt incurred by CPTC in the course of developing and operating the Private
Transportation Project, and neither Caltrans nor any other public entity shall be required to
continue toll collection in the event of a CPTC Default hereunder which is not cured or
remedied by CPTC or Lender as herein permitted. Caltrans shall be free, at its sole option,
to continue toll collection and repay CPTC's debt with respect to the Private
Transportation Project as provided in Section 16.4 hereof; provided, however, that the
foregoing shall be subject to Article 16 hereof and to any consent, agreement or other
instrument executed by Caltrans in favor of CPTC's Lenders or Leasehold Mortgagees.
Caltrans shall, to the maximum extent consistent with Laws and Regulations, assist CPTC
with documentation reasonably necessary to obtain and maintain financing for the
development, property acquisition, design, construction and subsequent operation and
maintenance of the Private Transportation Project. Caltrans' assistance may include
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reviewing, approving and executing documents which substantiate the terms and conditions
of this Agreement. In addition, Caltrans shall, promptly upon request of CPTC, execute,
acknowledge and deliver to CPTC, or any other party specified by CPTC, standard
consents and estoppel certificates.
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